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SIDELINED: TITLE IX RETALIATION CASES AND WOMEN’S 

LEADERSHIP IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS
 
ERIN E. BUZUVIS* 
INTRODUCTION
For fourteen years, Lindy Vivas was the head volleyball coach at California
State University at Fresno (Fresno State).1  In that position, she transformed a 
program that had never had a winning season into one that regularly produced 
successful and highly competitive teams.2  In fact,  under  Vivas, Fresno State  
women’s volleyball teams had an overall win-loss record of 263-167 and 
received more invitations to post-season tournaments—including national and 
NCAA tournaments—than all teams in the history of the program, and the 
Western Athletic Conference named her coach of the year three times.3  Her  
success notwithstanding, Vivas was informed in December 2004 that her
contract would not be renewed, ostensibly because she had failed to meet her 
performance objectives.4 
Vivas was more than a successful and winning coach. She was an advocate
for gender equity at a university with a long history of discrimination against
women’s athletics in violation of Title IX.5  Along with other female coaches and 
administrators, several of whom also lost their jobs,6 Vivas had complained
about discrimination to university officials and government regulators 
responsible for enforcing Title IX.7  Specifically, she alleged that Fresno State 
paid lower salaries and awarded shorter contracts to female coaches and 
allocated fewer resources, less support, and unequal access to facilities for the 
women’s volleyball team.8 
* Associate Professor, Western New England College School of Law.  Selections from this
Article were presented in connection with the Women’s Studies Department lecture series at SUNY
Oswego in October 2008, at the Association of American Law Schools’ annual meeting in January
2009, and at the Sport, Sexuality and Culture Conference at Ithaca College in March 2009.  Thanks to
Giovanna Shay and Kristine Newhall for feedback on earlier drafts. 
1. Verified Complaint at 1-2, Vivas v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. St. Univ., No. 06CECG00440 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Fresno County Feb. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Vivas Complaint].
2. Id. at 2.
3. Id. at 2–3.
4. Id. at 1, 7; see also Bryant-Jon Anteola, Bulldogs Let Vivas Go, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 7, 2004, at D1.
5. Id. at 4-5.
6. See Part II.A, infra. 
7. See Part II.A, infra. Vivas argued that these disparities violated Title IX as well as the 
university’s obligations under a remediation agreement with OCR and a consent decree that had
settled a Title IX lawsuit against the California State University System.
8. Vivas Complaint, supra note 1, at 3-4.
1
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Vivas filed suit against Fresno State, alleging that although the athletic
director cited performance reasons for her termination, she was actually fired for 
her gender, her marital status, her perceived sexual orientation, and her
whistleblowing on gender discrimination within the department.9  In July 2007, 
jurors in the Fresno County Superior Court agreed, except as to the marital 
status claim, and awarded her $5.85 million in damages10—at the time, the
largest jury award in a Title IX case.  Later that year, Fresno State announced a
multi-million dollar settlement with Diane Milutinovich, an athletic department 
official who also claimed she was fired in retaliation for her efforts to ensure the 
department’s compliance with Title IX.11  Fresno State then lost another high-
profile trial involving similar claims of retaliation.12 This time, the damages 
award to the plaintiff, former women’s basketball coach Stacy Johnson-Klein, 
was a staggering $19.1 million.13 
Due to the record-setting jury awards and multiple separate plaintiffs, the 
Fresno State cases are the most visible examples of Title IX retaliation cases in
the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of
Education,14 which recognized a private right of action for retaliatory 
discrimination under Title IX.  In the short time since the decision was released, 
it has already been invoked in a number of retaliation cases involving college 
athletics.15 Coaches, administrators, and other university officials from 
California to Florida—both male and female, but mostly female—have filed suit
against their institutions, complaining that their contracts were terminated or
not renewed, or that they were harassed or otherwise mistreated, because they
raised concerns about gender equity on behalf of students, other coaches, or
themselves.  These cases, some of which have also resulted in significant 
verdicts and settlements, provide insight into athletic department culture and
reveal obstacles women face in reaching positions of leadership in college 
9. Id.
 10. Bryant-Jon Anteola, Jury Awards Former ’Dogs Coach $5.85m: Panel Finds Unanimously on
Majority of Questions in Discrimination Suit, FRESNO BEE, July 10, 2007, at A1.  The judge later reduced
Vivas’s award to $4.52 million, though attorney’s fees and costs raised Fresno State’s total to more 
than $5.6 million; eventually, the parties settled Fresno State’s appeal for $5.2 million, including 
attorney’s fees.  Ken Robison, Vivas Award Cut to $4.52m: Judge Denies New Trial for Fresno State vs. 
Fired Volleyball Coach, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 13, 2007, at A1; George Hostetter, Vivas, CSU Reach 
Agreement: Former Fresno State Volleyball Coach to Receive Cash Payment, Annuity in Settling
Discrimination Suit, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 16, 2008, at D1.
 11. George Hostetter, Fresno State Suit Is Settled for $3.5m: Multinovich’s Deal Resolves Her Sexual
Discrimination Case Against the University, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 12, 2007, at A1.
12. George Hostetter & Bryant-Jon Anteola, TRIAL SHOCKER: $19M: Jury Says CSUF 
Discriminated Against Stacy Johnson-Klein, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 7, 2007, at A1.
13. Id.  The judge reduced this award to $6.6 million plus attorney’s fees, and the parties settled 
for $9 million.  George Hostetter, Jury Award Cut for Johnson-Klein: Take $6.6m or Face New Trial, Judge 
Tells Ex-CSUF Coach, FRESNO BEE, Feb. 9, 2008, at A1; George Hostetter, Deal Is Reached in Coach 
Lawsuit: Stacy Johnson-Klein and Fresno State Agree to Settle for $9 Million, FRESNO BEE, June 18, 2008, at
A1. 
14. 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
 15. The Jackson decision has also been invoked in Title IX retaliation litigation involving school 
districts.  See Suzanne E. Eckes & David P. Thompson, Retaliation Lawsuits in Public Schools: What 
Effect Has the Jackson v. Birmingham Decision Had on School Personnel?, 232 WEST EDUC. L. REP. 557, 566
(2008) (noting there have only been a few such cases and that they have generated “mixed results”). 













          
  
  





    
      
 









   
  
     
 
 3  SIDELINED
athletics.  These cultural considerations are particularly relevant in light of the 
enormous gender gap among college head coaches and athletic administrators. 
Women fill less than a quarter of head coach and athletic director positions in
college athletics, and are even minorities among coaches of women’s teams.16 
Discrimination against women seeking or serving in leadership positions in
sport is worthy of analysis, not only for the sake of individual women who 
desire to self-actualize as a head coach or athletic administrator, but because the 
unique role of sport in society gives underrepresentation of women in
leadership positions additional significance.  Due to its high visibility and 
widespread appeal17—its veritable iconic status—sport is a salient site of 
cultural production.18  That is, sport operates on a symbolic level, reflecting and 
transmitting shared cultural values.  Among these values, sport helps define the
attributes associated with leadership,19 and thus, derivatively, power.20  By  
remaining, in the words of Carole Oglesby, “uniquely impervious to the 
inclusion of women,”21 sport operates to ensure women’s exclusion from
powerful social roles more generally, as both men and women exposed to the 
male-dominated realm of sport “internalize . . . the dominant vision” of power 
as a masculine trait.22  Put another way, when women serve  in head coaching
 16. LINDA J. CARPENTER & R. VIVIAN ACOSTA, WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT: A
LONGITUDINAL, NATIONAL STUDY THIRTY ONE YEAR UPDATE (2008), http://acostacarpenter.org 
(reporting based on 2008 data that women fill 20.6% of head coach positions for men’s and women’s 
teams, 42.8% of head coach positions of women’s teams, and 21.3% of athletic director positions).
 17. Lois Bryson, Challenges to Male Hegemony in Sport, in  SPORT, MEN AND THE GENDER ORDER:
CRITICAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 173, 174 (Michael A. Messner & Donald F. Sabo eds., 1990) (saying 
sport is “an important, admired social activity . . . something to which we are exposed daily and 
from very young ages . . . an immediate mass reality [which will only be magnified] with increasing 
commercialization and media exposure”).
 18. Carole Oglesby, Intersections: Women’s Sport Leadership and Feminist Praxis, in  WOMEN ON
POWER: LEADERSHIP REDEFINED 290, 292 (Sue J.M. Freeman, et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter WOMEN ON
POWER]. 
19. Mary Jo Kane, Leadership, Sport, and Gender, in WOMEN ON POWER, supra note 18, at 114, 115.
 20. Nancy Theberge, Gender, Work, and Power: The Case of Women in Coaching, 15 CANADIAN J. OF 
SOC. 59, 61 (1990).
 21. Oglesby, supra note 18, at 291; see also Janet S. Fink & Donna L. Pastore, Diversity in Sport?: 
Utilizing the Business Literature to Devise a Comprehensive Framework of Diversity Initiatives, 51 QUEST
310, 311 (1999) (“Perhaps nowhere is discrimination and oppression more evident than in Division I-
A intercollegiate athletics.”); Kane, supra note 19, at 115 (calling sport one of the “few male bastions
remaining” and the site of “some of the most extreme examples of oppressive stereotypes 
concerning gender and leadership”). 
22. PIERRE BORDIEU, MASCULINE DOMINATION 94-95 (Richard Nice trans., Stanford University
Press 2001); see also id. (“[As a result of a] whole series of previous experiences, particularly in sport, 
which often gives rise to experience of discrimination, . . . [women] cannot see themselves giving
orders to men, or, quite simply, working in a typically male occupation.”); Nancy Theberge, The
Construction of Gender in Sport: Women, Coaching, and the Naturalization of Difference, 40 SOC. PROBLEMS
301, 301 (1993) (calling sport “one of the cultural practices most significant in the construction of
gender” because it has served, for men, as “a setting for the development and display of traits and 
abilities that signify masculine power and authority”); Warren A. Whisenant et al., Success and
Gender: Determining the Rate of Advancement for Intercollegiate Athletic Directors, 47 SEX ROLES 485, 486 
(2002) (noting that the gender gap in leadership in sport serves to further entrench “hegemonic 
masculinity”). 
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4 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 17:1 2010
positions, “the visibility and responsibility associated with coaching implies [sic]
that women are capable in leadership positions of any kind.”23 
The current spate of retaliation cases is, therefore, a relevant source of 
information about an important social problem.  Moreover, the fact that
plaintiffs in Title IX retaliation cases against college athletic departments are 
enjoying new levels of success provides an opportunity to speculate 
optimistically about the power of law to effect positive change in the culture of
college athletics.  Following the Supreme Court’s recent validation of a private 
right of action to challenge retaliation in Jackson, coaches and athletic
administrators have never before had more legal remedies with which to tackle
sex discrimination in college athletics.  Together with the recent high-profile
multi-million dollar jury verdicts and settlements, these legal remedies create a
strong incentive for athletic departments seeking to avoid liability to monitor for
and address institutional practices that drive and deter women from coaching. 
With this in mind, this Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes Title
IX’s role as an employment discrimination statute and examines the 
contribution of Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education as a catalyst for coaches’
retaliation claims.  Part II describes in greater detail the wave of Title IX
retaliation cases that has followed the Jackson decision, including those against 
Fresno State. Part III examines the content of those cases in connection with 
existing empirical and theoretical scholarship about women in college coaching
and athletic administration.  Part IV examines the legal significance of the
retaliation cases as a trend, and concludes with cautious optimism about the
potential for law to help expose, remedy, and deter discriminatory practices 
within the leadership of college sport. 
PART I 
TITLE IX, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, AND RETALIATION
Though Title IX is perhaps best known for its role in mitigating sex
discrimination against female students and athletes, the statute also protects
education sector employees against discrimination on the basis of sex.24  The  
Supreme Court has confirmed that the statute contains an implied private right
of action,25 which plaintiffs may use to seek monetary damages.26  Moreover,  
Title IX plaintiffs are not subject to the cap on compensatory damages, statute of 
limitations, or exhaustion requirements that apply to employment 
discrimination cases filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,27 which 
also governs educational institutions as employers.  Some jurisdictions hold that 
Title VII is the exclusive route for relief for employment discrimination claims in 
23. Kurt A. Stahura & Michael Greenwood, Sex of Head Coach as a Function of Sport Type Prestige 
and Institutional Structure, 17 APPLIED RES. IN COACHING AND ATHLETICS 1, 2 (2002).
24. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535-36 (1982) (upholding Title IX regulations 
that prohibit schools from discriminating on the basis of sex in their capacities as employers). 
25. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
26. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

















      
     
     
  
     
  
  
   
  
   
 
   
 
  
   
 
 
     
 
     
   
 5  SIDELINED
the context of education.28  In jurisdictions where Title IX is not precluded, 
however, the statute provides an attractive employment discrimination remedy 
for coaches and other school employees. 
Prior to the Court’s 2005 decision in Jackson, it was unclear whether and to
what extent private enforcement of Title IX extended to retaliation claims.  Over 
the years, federal courts including both the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of
Appeals29 had allowed plaintiffs to bring retaliation claims against a college or
university employer, but their decisions were called into question by a 2001 
Supreme Court decision, Alexander v. Sandoval.30 At issue in Sandoval was 
whether a private right of action existed for violations of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,31 the statute that prohibits race discrimination by programs 
receiving federal funds.32  The Court held that the plaintiff’s challenge was 
beyond the scope of the statute’s private right of action because the prohibition
against discrimination with a disparate racial impact is contained only in Title 
VI’s implementing regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice, rather
than within the statute itself.33  Private enforcement of Title VI is therefore 
limited to intentional discrimination prohibited by the statute and does not 
extend to other manners of discrimination prohibited only by regulation.  Like
the disparate impact discrimination at issue in Sandoval, retaliation against
employees of educational institutions who complain of discrimination is
prohibited under Title IX’s regulations,34 but is not specifically mentioned in the 
statute itself.  Since Title IX was modeled on Title VI and is regularly subject to 
judicial interpretations of Title VI, some courts therefore interpreted Sandoval to
foreclose private enforcement of retaliation claims under Title IX.35 
28. Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 752 (5th Cir. 1995); Gibson v. Hickman, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1481,
1484 (M.D. Ga. 1998); Cooper v. Gustavus Adolphus Coll., 957 F. Supp. 191, 194 (D. Minn. 1997). But
see Bedard v. Roger Williams Univ., 989 F. Supp. 94, 97 (D.R.I. 1997) (recognizing the existence of a 
private remedy under Title IX); Nelson v. Univ. of Maine Sys., 923 F. Supp. 275, 278-79 (D. Me. 1996)
(same); Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142, 145 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (same).
29. Lowrey v. Texas A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 254 (5th Cir. 1997); Preston v. Virginia ex 
rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 205-06 (4th Cir. 1994); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 2000 
WL 34507658, *3 (E.D. Va. 2000); Murray v. New York Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 248-49,
251 (2d Cir. 1995); Nelson, 923 F. Supp. at 280.
30. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
31. Id. at 278.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
33. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291 (“Thus, when a statute has provided a general authorization for 
private enforcement of regulations, it may perhaps be correct that the intent displayed in each
regulation can determine whether or not it is privately enforceable.  But it is most certainly incorrect 
to say that language in a regulation can conjure up a private cause of action that has not been
authorized by Congress.  Agencies may play the sorcerer’s apprentice but not the sorcerer himself.”). 
34. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (“No recipient [of federal funds] or other person shall intimidate,
threaten, coerce, or discriminate against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right 
or privilege secured by section 601 [of Title VI] or this part, or because he has made a complaint,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under 
this part.”); see also 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (incorporating § 100.7(e) into Title IX implementing 
regulations).
35. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, passim (11th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 544 U.S. 
167 (2005); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 156 F. Supp. 2d 579, passim (E.D. Va. 2001); Atkinson v. 
Lafayette Coll., No. 01-CV-2141, 2002 WL 123449, *5-*7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2002); but see Peters v.
Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 324-25 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that Sandoval does not foreclose private
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6 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 17:1 2010
One of those courts was the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case 
brought by Coach Roderick Jackson against the Board of Education in 
Birmingham, Alabama.36  Coach Jackson was a physical education teacher and
girls’ basketball coach at one of the district high schools.  After he complained to
school district officials about inequitable allocation of athletic facilities and other 
resources between girls’ and boys’ basketball teams, he received negative 
performance evaluations and ultimately lost his coaching position.37  He sued 
the school board, arguing that because he was dismissed for blowing the whistle 
on sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX, Title IX protected him personally. 
The school board successfully argued before the district court and the Eleventh 
Circuit that private enforcement of Title IX did not extend to retaliation claims.38 
The court reasoned that the contrast between Title IX, which does not contain an 
anti-retaliation provision, and Title VII, which does expressly prohibit 
retaliation against employees who challenge unlawful employment
discrimination,39 suggests that Congress did not intend for Title IX’s prohibition 
on discrimination to encompass retaliation.  Applying Sandoval, the court
concluded that since retaliation is not prohibited by Title IX itself but only by its 
implementing regulations, private plaintiffs could not rely on Title IX to provide 
a remedy against retaliation.40 
Jackson’s appeal from this decision gave the Supreme Court an opportunity 
to clarify the meaning and scope of Sandoval. In its 2005 decision,41 the Court
agreed that Title IX’s private right of action extends only to conduct prohibited 
within the statute itself, rather than in a regulatory interpretation.42  However, as 
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion reasoned, retaliation against whistleblowers 
is included in Title IX’s broad, statutory prohibition on sex discrimination.43 
O’Connor rejected the appellate court’s conclusion, drawn from its comparison
of Title IX to Title VII, that Congress intends to include retaliation in anti-
enforcement of retaliation under Title VI, but that the right does not protect third parties who
complain of violations). 
36. Jackson, 309 F.3d 1333, passim (11th Cir. 2002).
37. Id. at 1335.
38. Id. at 1335-36.
39. Id. at 1345 n.12 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)).  The retaliation alleged by Coach Jackson was
outside the scope of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision because his coaching duties were revoked 
not for complaining about discrimination in the terms and conditions of his employment, but for
complaining about discriminatory treatment of his students. 
40. Id. at 1345-46.
41. 544 U.S. 167.
42. Id. at 178.
43. See id. at 173-74:
Retaliation against a person because that person has complained of sex discrimination is 
another form of intentional sex discrimination encompassed by Title IX’s private cause of
action.  Retaliation is, by definition, an intentional act.  It is a form of “discrimination”
because the complainant is being subjected to differential treatment.  Moreover, retaliation
is discrimination “on the basis of sex” because it is an intentional response to the nature of 
the complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination.  We conclude that when a funding 
recipient retaliates against a person because he complains of sex discrimination, this
constitutes intentional “discrimination” “on the basis of sex,” in violation of Title IX 
(internal citations omitted). 





























   
 
 
     




   
        
 7  SIDELINED
discrimination statutes only when it does so expressly.44  She pointed out that
Title IX prohibits all discrimination in its scope that has not been expressly
exempted, whereas Title VII prohibits only that which has been enumerated. 
Therefore, the fact that retaliation is not expressly mentioned in Title IX does not 
put retaliation beyond the statute’s scope.45 
Thus, after Jackson, it is clear that plaintiffs may rely on Title IX’s private
right of action to challenge both direct discrimination prohibited under Title IX 
and punitive action directed at those, such as coaches, who complain about or
seek remedy for perceived discrimination.  So clarified, Title IX’s private right of
action is a significant weapon against sex discrimination generally and in the 
context of college athletics specifically.  Whereas Title VII makes private
enforcement available to plaintiffs who faced retaliation for challenging 
discriminatory employment conditions, plaintiffs may use Title IX to seek 
remedy for retaliation motivated by their complaints about any ostensible Title 
IX violations.  Such violations may include an athletic department’s failure to
provide an equitable number of athletic opportunities to female students,
adequate resources and support to women’s programs, or equal treatment of 
coaches.  Moreover, a retaliation plaintiff need not prove that the predicate 
discrimination occurred, only that the plaintiff reasonably believed the violation 
to exist.46  A whistleblower coach will be more likely to challenge the reprisal
against her even if she would not (or could not) have directly challenged the
discrimination she perceived due to legal or evidentiary weaknesses inherent in
such claims.  For example, it is difficult for female coaches to challenge sex-
based pay discrimination because they must demonstrate the university’s failure
to treat them similarly to a male coach of comparable responsibility.47  Due to 
Title IX’s cause of action for retaliation, it is more likely that a coach who is fired
for complaining about perceived pay discrimination will pursue some relief 
against the university than if she was limited to remedies for pay discrimination
itself or if her retaliation claim required her to succeed on the pay discrimination
claim itself.48 
In addition, the Jackson Court’s interpretation of Title IX’s private right of 
action significantly expands statutory protection against employment 
discrimination in the education sector. While college and university employees 
may challenge employment discrimination under Title VII as well as (or as an
alternative to) Title IX,49 Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is limited to
44. Id. at 175.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Howell v. N. Cent. Coll., 331 F. Supp. 2d 660, 663-66 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Nelson v. Univ.
of Me. Sys., 923 F. Supp. 275, 284 (D. Me. 1996); see also Deborah Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 
18, 76-77 (2005) (“Protection from retaliation would mean little if it were otherwise.  Most people 
lack knowledge about whether what they perceive as discrimination is actually unlawful, and
judicial outcomes in discrimination cases frequently depend on the identity of judges and jurors.”).
47. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode & Christopher J. Walker, Gender Equity in College Athletics:
Women Coaches as a Case Study, 4 STAN. J. OF CIV. R-CIV. L. 1, 15-19 (2008); Janet Judge et al., Pay
Equity: A Legal and Practical Approach to the Compensation of College Coaches, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 
549, passim (1996).
48. This is examined in detail at Part IV.A, infra. 
49. Diane Heckman, The Glass Sneaker: Thirty Years of Victories and Defeats Involving Title IX and
Sex Discrimination in Athletics, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 589, 590-93 (2003)
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retaliation motivated by the employee’s complaints about employment
discrimination.50  Therefore, Title VII would not apply to coaches punished for 
complaining about discrimination against their players.  Moreover, as noted 
earlier, relying on Title IX instead of Title VII avoids the damages cap and 
extends a remedy for retaliation to those plaintiffs who may have failed to 
preserve their Title VII claims by filing first with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 180 days.51  In addition, while some 
states have whistleblower protection statutes that may also protect college and
university employees who complain about perceived sex discrimination,52 many 
are restricted in scope to public employees.53  Title IX’s cause  of action for  
retaliation, on the other hand, applies regardless of state law, and protects
employees of any public or private school that receives federal  funds.  Lastly,  
while the First Amendment may also protect education sector employees against 
reprisal for engaging in protected speech, this remedy only applies to public
institutions.54  It is further limited by a recent Supreme Court decision55 
confining this application of the First Amendment to protected speech by 
employees in their personal rather than professional capacities—a restriction 
likely to apply to coaches who complain about discrimination in college or
university athletic departments.56 
By expanding the remedies for retaliation in the ways described above, and
by raising the profile of retaliation in general, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Jackson laid the groundwork for suits against colleges and universities by
numerous coaches and others in athletics administration who raised concerns
about gender equity in athletics and experienced adverse employment 
consequences. To be sure, many of these cases also involve claims of direct
discrimination, sexual harassment, or retaliation predicated on employment 
discrimination complaints, all of which were actionable prior to Jackson. Title IX 
retaliation claims in the mold of Jackson are in the foreground of these cases, 
suggesting they are providing the momentum for this trend.  Intersecting and 
(explaining and citing examples that some courts hold Title VII precludes a Title IX right of action 
for employment discrimination, others have held that Title IX’s right of action only applies in such
context as retaliation where Title VII’s remedy is limited, still others hold that a Title IX cause of
action for employment discrimination may be alleged, but differ as to whether Title IX, Title VII, or
Title VI standards apply). 
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).  The Supreme Court recently held that the retaliatory action 
prohibited by this provision is not limited to “workplace-related or employment-related” actions, 
but includes any adverse action that could dissuade the employee from protesting discriminatory
workplace conditions.  Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006).  Under this 
expansive reading, a coach who was not only fired, but harassed, investigated, and subjected to
closer scrutiny in retaliation for protected activity like complaining of salary discrimination against 
female coaches would have a cause of action under Title VII as well as Title IX. 
51. 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e-5(e)(1), 1981a(b).
52. See  NATIONAL CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS (Aug. 2005),
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13390.
53. See id.
54. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating the First Amendment into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
55. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).
56. See, e.g., Potera-Haskins v. Gamble, 519 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1116-17 (D. Mont. 2007), discussed 
infra at Part II.D.2.
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 9  SIDELINED
related discrimination is either brought to light in the context of the retaliation 
claim  itself,  or in separate claims that piggyback  on the momentum of the  
retaliation claim.  Thus, a right of action for retaliation is valuable not only as a
weapon of enforcement against reprisals for sex discrimination, but for 
increasing the likelihood of litigation challenging the predicate discrimination
itself.  Consequently, there is increased visibility and public awareness of the 
multiple, interrelated components of discrimination operating against women in
college athletic departments, which are often difficult to address in a stand-alone 
claim.  Over its next two Parts, this Article will present this trend of cases in
greater detail and then examine those cases thematically. 
PART II 
RETALIATION CASES: HISTORY AND THE RECENT TREND
Gender-based retaliation cases in the context of college athletics are not a 
new phenomenon and certainly predate the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in 
Jackson. In 1997, for example, former Oregon State University softball coach 
Vickie Dugan won a $1.3 million jury verdict57 in a lawsuit that claimed OSU 
violated her First Amendment rights when it fired her in retaliation for
defending the softball team’s varsity status and for cooperating with
Department of Education Office for Civil Rights’ (“OCR”) investigation of the
university’s Title IX compliance.58  OSU argued that Dugan was fired because  
her team produced a 0-24 record for the 1994 season.59  However, Dugan  
convinced the jury that her team’s losing season was a product of the very
inadequate and inequitable funding that she was fired for challenging.60 
Jan Lowrey was another early retaliation plaintiff.  In 1995, she charged 
that she was demoted from her position of Women’s Athletic Coordinator at
Tarleton State (part of the Texas A&M system) after she complained about 
gender discrimination within the athletic department, including inequitable
distribution of resources between men’s and women’s teams, as well as lower
pay for female athletic department employees.61  The district court dismissed
57. The parties later agreed to settle OSU’s appeal for over $1 million, a figure that included
attorney’s fees and costs.  Sharon Ginn, Gender Lawsuit’s End Gives “Relief,”  ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
Jan. 17, 1999, at 2C.
 58. Abby Haight, Legal Fight Leaves Former Coach Vindicated but Tired, Frustrated, OREGONIAN, 
Nov. 17, 1997, at D03.  A similar claim filed today would likely fail as a result of the Supreme Court’s
subsequent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006), which limited First Amendment 
protection for public employees to statements made in their personal rather than professional 
capacities. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
 59. Eric Mortenson, Ex-Oregon State Softball Coach Prevails in Discrimination Suit, REG.-GUARD, 
Nov. 13, 1997.
60. American Association of University Women, Home, Advocacy, Legal, Advocacy, Case Support, 
Dugan v. Oregon State University (accessed July 20, 2009) at http://www.aauw.org/advocacy/
laf/cases/dugan.cfm; Ginn, supra note 57, at 2C; Tad Shannon, Lawyers for Oregon State Contest Jury
Verdict in Gender-Bias Case, Eugene REG.-GUARD, April 10, 1998; Haight, supra note 58; Mortenson, 
supra note 59.
61. Lowrey v. Texas A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1997).
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Lowrey’s case, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated it, agreeing that
Title IX extended relief to retaliation claims not covered by Title VII.62  Similarly,
an undisclosed settlement terminated litigation between Nova Southeastern 
University and its former softball coach, Robyn Handler.  Handler had sued in
2002, alleging that she was given poor performance evaluations and was 
subsequently terminated in retaliation for filing complaints with OCRabout
unequal pay and treatment of the women’s softball team.63 
While retaliation cases in college athletics—even successful ones like those 
noted above—were not unknown prior to Jackson, the cases filed since the 
Court’s 2005 ruling are significant because they are recent and because there are 
enough of them to examine for trends.  Thus, this part will describe those 
retaliation cases, both resolved and pending, that were filed or litigated in 
substantial part in the wake of Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education.
A. Fresno State 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this Article, the most notorious
institutional defendant in this contemporary trend of retaliation cases is Fresno
State University.  Fresno State has a long history of Title IX complaints.  For 
much of the 1990s, the athletic department was subject to regulatory scrutiny 
after an investigation by the OCR that revealed widespread Title IX violations
including significant disparities in opportunities for female student-athletes64 
and inequities in the treatment of existing men’s and women’s teams.65  Under
pressure to comply with Title IX or else lose its federal funding, Fresno State 
committed itself to a Corrective Action Plan to increase support and status for
women’s sports.66  In 2001, however, Fresno State’s Associate Athletic Director,
62. Id. at 249, n.7 (citing Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 755 (5th Cir. 1995)).  Thus, Lowrey was
allowed to proceed with her claims that she was demoted for protesting inequitable allocation of
resources between men’s and women’s sports as violations of Title IX.  However, the Supreme
Court, in Alexander v. Sandoval, discussed supra, cast doubt on the private right of action for
retaliation under Title IX that had been recognized by the Fifth Circuit.
 63. Jamie Malernee, Coach Sues NSU, Claims Gender Bias; University Denies Charges, Alleges She
Was Unreliable and Belligerent, SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 20, 2002, at 1B.  In press about the lawsuit, Handler
described the athletic director who terminated her, Corey Johnson, as “demeaning and homophobic”
and described how he insisted on having more “feminine role models in the office” and required 
that she wear a dress to an office banquet for fear of what people would “assume” if she “showed up
in a pantsuit.”  Id.
64. See, e.g., Vivas Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.  OCR found that Fresno State did not comply 
with any of the three alternative tests for measuring equity in the number of athletic opportunities 
available to each sex.  Women comprised 54.3% of the student body but received only 27.3% of the 
athletic opportunities.  The university did not have a history and continuous practice of expanding 
athletic opportunities for women, and it had made no effort to determine whether it was otherwise
satisfying the interests and abilities of the female student population.  Letter from John E. Palornino, 
Reg’l Civil Rights Dir., Dep’t of Educ., to John E. Welty, President, Cal. State Univ. at Fresno, Apr. 6, 
1994 (on file with Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy) (summarizing OCR’s investigatory 
findings). 
65. Fresno State was also party to a consent decree that settled litigation between the California
National Organization for Women and the California State University System, which had gender 
disparities in athletic opportunities, funding, and scholarships.  See Vivas Complaint, supra note 1, at
3.
66. Vivas Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
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Diane Milutinovich, a 22-year department veteran who had worked on Fresno
State’s compliance plan, complained internally about the athletic department’s
backsliding on its obligations under the plan.  In a complaint to OCR, she cited 
the department’s failure to raise the proportion of female student-athletes as 
agreed and its reluctance to devote resources to women’s athletics.  She pointed
out disparities in the compensation paid to employees of men’s and women’s
athletics respectively, and complained that women’s sports had been demoted 
from or denied “tier one” (most favored) status in violation of Fresno State’s
obligations under the Corrective Action Plan.  Soon thereafter, newly-appointed 
Athletic Director Scott Johnson announced a department reorganization that 
eliminated Milutinovich’s position.  This reorganization resulted in her transfer 
to a different university department.67  Milutinovich sued, arguing that Johnson 
transferred her in retaliation for filing the complaint with OCR.68  She later filed
a new lawsuit to challenge her reassignment from her new position as retaliation
for her continued efforts in support of gender equity.69 
Before volleyball coach Lindy Vivas’s termination in 2004, she too had filed
a complaint with OCR in which she challenged the athletic department’s 
reluctance to promote volleyball to a tier one sport.70  She also filed an internal
grievance with the university’s human resources department, challenging the
disparity in the length of employment contracts for male and female coaches
and, like Milutinovich, Vivas alleged that her termination was retaliation for
challenging the department’s gender inequities.71 A few months later, the 
women’s basketball coach, Stacy Johnson-Klein, was placed on administrative
leave for mistreating players and ultimately terminated after an investigation 
revealed that she had “inappropriately obtained” pain medications from
students and staff.72 Although Johnson-Klein admitted to obtaining Vicodin 
from a player, she too filed suit and claimed that the investigation itself was a
retaliatory response to her internal complaints about sexual harassment and 
gender disparities73 affecting the women’s basketball team and her threat to file
a complaint with OCR.74
 67. Jim Davis, Former Fresno State Athletics Official Sues: Milutinovich Contends Title IX Violations, 
FRESNO BEE, Oct. 28, 2004, at B1.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Vivas Complaint, supra note 1, at 4-5; see also Andy Boogaard, Title IX Inquiry Continues:
Fresno State Gender Equity Case Reaches 20th Month, FRESNO BEE, Nov. 13, 2005, at C1.
71. Vivas Complaint, supra note 1, at 1, 4.
 72. Bryant-Jon Anteola, Reaction Runs the Gamut: Some Express Relief, Others Dismay After Coach’s
Termination, FRESNO BEE, Mar. 3, 2005, at A8.  In the university’s public statement about Johnson-
Klein’s firing, President John Welty also charged her with insubordination, fiscal improprieties, and 
disregard for the health and welfare of her players.  Id.
73. Cyndee Fontana & Doug Hoagland, Sidelined, Not Silenced: Stacy Johnson-Klein Tells Her Side
of a Sports Soap Opera that Riveted the Valley, FRESNO BEE, Mar. 20, 2005, at A1. In memos to the
athletic department officials preceding the investigation, Johnson-Klein had reportedly complained 
of inequities in marketing, support staff, and athletic training.  Id.
 74. Jeff Davis, Attorney Points to Coach’s Complaint: She Brought Forth Allegations of Sexual
Harassment, He Says, FRESNO BEE, Feb. 11, 2005, at A1; George Hostetter, Ex-Coach Grilled on Pain-Pill
Issue, FRESNO BEE, Nov. 6, 2007, at D1.
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In October 2007, Fresno State settled with Milutinovich for $3.5 million.75 
Both Vivas’s and Johnson-Klein’s lawsuits proceeded to trial, where they 
produced not only multi-million dollar verdicts in the plaintiffs’ favor, but
volumes of testimony about the hostile environment and discriminatory 
treatment of female coaches and staff.  Jurors in Vivas’s three-week trial in the 
summer of 2007 found truth in Vivas’s allegations that she was terminated for 
advocating gender equity, including efforts to hold the department to its 
promises under the Corrective Action Plan, particularly, to elevate women’s 
athletic programs to tier one status and to move women’s volleyball 
competitions from the gymnasium to the university’s premier venue, and for
advocating multi-year contracts for successful, long-serving female coaches like
herself and softball coach Margie Wright.76  The jury also agreed that her 
termination was not only retaliatory but was direct discrimination on the basis 
of her sex and perceived lesbian sexual orientation.77  Stacy Johnson-Klein 
testified on Vivas’s behalf about Johnson’s plans to “get rid of lesbians in the
athletic department,” and his preference for hiring “female coaches who were 
straight and attractive.”78  She also described how Johnson and others referred 
to Vivas, Milutinovich, and softball coach Margie Wright, as “the other team” in 
contrast to “the home team” employees who did not make trouble, and how 
Johnson had instructed other athletic department officials to “make Vivas’[s] life
miserable.”79 Wright testified about a 2000 incident in which male athletic 
department staff made posters depicting stick figures of female athletes’ bodies
with male administrators’ heads and proclaimed “Ugly women’s athletes
day.”80  Wright also corroborated Johnson-Klein’s descriptions of the 
department’s homophobic culture by describing the homophobic comments 
members of the school’s baseball team directed to her players.81 
Fresno State’s defense—that Vivas was fired for performance reasons, 
including her alleged unwillingness to schedule competitions against top 
opponents—was exposed as pretext.  The jury returned a $5.85 million verdict in
Vivas’s favor, which was later reduced to $4.52 million due to a weak
evidentiary basis for the jury’s calculation of Vivas’s future nonmonetary 
75. Hostetter, Fresno State Suit is Settled, supra note 11, at A1.
76. Vivas Complaint, supra note 1, at 4-5; Bryant-Jon Anteola, Words Scarce After Lawsuit: In Wake
of Vivas Trial, Many Stay Tight-Lipped, FRESNO BEE, July 15, 2007, at C1.  In 2004, Wright filed a
complaint with OCR alleging retaliation.  Id.  In 2008, after the Vivas and Johnson-Klein verdicts,
Fresno State agreed to pay Wright $605,000 to prevent her from filing a lawsuit of her own.  George
Hostetter, Fresno State Settles with Softball Coach for $605k, FRESNO BEE, July 15, 2008, at A1.
77. Bryant-Jon Anteola & Daniel Lyght, University to Volley Vivas Trial Verdict: Fresno State
Weighs Options, Vows to Appeal, FRESNO BEE, July 11, 2007, at A1 (reprinting the text of the jury 
verdict form, including, “2.4 Did CSU discriminate against Lindy Vivas because of her perceived 
sexual orientation (lesbian)? – Yes”).
 78. Bryant-Jon Anteola, Ex-Bulldogs Coach Johnson-Klein Takes Center Stage at Trial, FRESNO BEE, 
June 22, 2007, at A1; see also Bryant-Jon Anteola, Fresno State, Vivas Await Jury: Parties Involved Wrap 
Up Their Cases in Discrimination Suit, FRESNO BEE, July 6, 2007, at D1.
 79. Anteola, Ex-Bulldogs Coach, supra note 78.
 80. Bryant-Jon Anteola, Wright Tells of Derogatory School Party: Attorneys Become Combative in 
Vivas Trial, FRESNO BEE, June 15, 2007, at D1.
81. Id.
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damages. But even in its reduced form, Lindy Vivas’s verdict was the largest 
awarded in a Title IX case.82 
Despite addressing a similar pattern of discrimination, harassment, and
retaliation, Johnson-Klein’s trial was quite different from Vivas’s.  The lynchpin
to Fresno State’s defense of Johnson-Klein’s wrongful discharge claim was the 
undisputed fact that she had used painkillers during her tenure as head 
women’s basketball coach and that she had taken Vicodin pills from one of her
players.83  This drug usage provided a legal and persuasive justification for the 
decision to terminate Johnson-Klein’s employment.84  However, over the course
of the two-month trial, Johnson-Klein’s attorneys successfully neutralized
Fresno State’s termination defense with two key arguments.  First, they
presented evidence suggesting that Athletic Director Scott Johnson called for an
investigation of Johnson-Klein in order to find a reason to fire her.  Both the 
timing of the investigation, which commenced soon after Johnson-Klein
threatened to file a complaint with OCR over inequitable treatment of the 
women’s basketball team,85 and the fact that Johnson-Klein’s behavior had not 
been the subject of any serious complaints until the investigation supported this
theory. Although the investigation produced a detailed account of Johnson-
Klein’s drug and behavior problems, in light of the apparently retaliatory nature 
of the decision to investigate, these reasons did not appear to be the university’s 
primary motive in firing her. 
The second way in which Johnson-Klein neutralized the university’s
argument that she was fired for drug abuse was by turning that argument into
evidence of a sexist double standard.  According to witness testimony, around
the same time that Johnson-Klein was struggling with painkillers, the head 
men’s basketball coach Ray Lopes was helping his players cover up positive
drug tests so that they could continue to play.86  Upon discovering this, Fresno 
82. Robison, supra note 10, at A1. Cf. Anteola & Lygh, supra note 77.  Fresno State appealed, but 
later settled for $5.2 million, including attorney’s fees. 
Prior to Vivas’s case, the largest jury verdict in a Title IX case was the $2 million award to Heather
Sue Mercer in 2000, a verdict that was later vacated on appeal.  See Mercer v. Duke Univ., No. 01-1512,
2002 WL 31528244 at *644 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 2002) (unpublished decision) (holding that Title IX does 
not support private right of action for punitive damages).  Mercer had sued Duke University for
discriminatory treatment she received as a kicker on the football team. 
In cases involving coaches, the largest Title IX jury verdicts prior to Vivas’s were Sanya Tyler’s $2.4 
million verdict (later reduced to $1.1 million) against Howard University in 1994, in a case that
alleged sex discrimination and salary inequity, and Vicki Dugan’s $1.28 million award against
Oregon State University in 1997. See Lori Riley, Equal to the Task: Howard Women’s Coach Won’t Back
Down, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 12, 1996, at C1; see Ginn, supra note 57 and accompanying text.
 83. Jeff Davis, Coach Took Player’s Drug, Lawyer Says: Women’s Basketball Team Member Received
the Painkiller After Knee Surgery, FRESNO BEE, Feb. 22, 2005, at A1.
84. Id.
85. Johnson-Klein had also recently complained to Johnson of sexual harassment by her
supervisor, Randy Welniak.  Only three weeks prior to these complaints, Johnson-Klein was told by
a department official that she was “doing a great job.”  Order on Motions for New Trial and 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Johnson-Klein v. Cal. State Univ., Fresno, No. 05CECG02645
at 30 (Cal. Super. Ct. Fresno County Feb. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Johnson-Klein Order]. 
86. George Hostetter, Bulldog Drug Policy Faulted: Ex-Official, Testifying in Lawsuit, Says Physician 
Took Issue with Program, FRESNO BEE, Nov. 8, 2007, at D1; Matt James, School Better Off Cutting Some
Losses, FRESNO BEE, Nov. 16, 2007, at D1.
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State quietly paid Lopes $200,000 in settlement of his employment contract,87 
even though he had  also racked up hundreds of NCAA violations and,  
according to witnesses, stonewalled a police investigation of one of his players 
for murder.88 This cast doubt on the university’s claim to have zero tolerance for
drugs, and suggested that it was not the reason for Johnson-Klein’s termination.
Aside from the drug issue, Johnson-Klein’s trial also differed from Vivas’s
in the way sexuality factored into the case.  While Vivas alleged and successfully
demonstrated to the jury that she was targeted in part because she was
perceived as a lesbian (and because she associated with Milutinovich and
Wright, who were similarly stigmatized), Johnson-Klein’s theory was that she 
was hired and received favorable treatment initially because of her heterosexy
appearance and behavior.  Johnson-Klein’s sexuality, therefore, was not 
stigmatized so much as exploited.  During Vivas’s trial, Johnson-Klein testified 
that she was hired “as a straight female to clean up the program” and to “sell” a 
“family atmosphere.”89  In her own case, she described how Athletic Director
Johnson publically referred to her as “my Miss America,” and once suggested
that she “go one-on-one” with a university supporter.90  Yet, when Johnson-
Klein emphasized her femininity and heterosexuality, athletic department 
officials criticized her appearance91 and subjected her to sexual harassment in 
the form of groping, solicitations, and other inappropriate remarks.92 
Johnson-Klein’s jury agreed that she had suffered harassment and 
retaliation and awarded her $19.1 million in damages.  Skeptical of the basis for 
the noneconomic damages included in this award, the trial judge reduced the 
award to $6.6 million plus attorney’s fees and costs.93  In June 2008, Fresno State 
agreed to drop its appeal in exchange for a $9 million total payout over 20
years.94 
B. Florida Gulf Coast University
Florida Gulf Coast University is, like Fresno State, paying several million
dollars to settle Title IX retaliation cases filed by two female coaches and the 
former university counsel who advocated on their behalf.  The dispute giving
rise to this litigation began in May 2007, when two female head coaches, Jaye
Flood (volleyball) and Holly Vaughn (golf), along with two female assistant 
87. George Hostetter, Fresno State Drug Policies Contrasted, Fresno Bee, Oct. 18, 2007, at A1.
 88. George Hostetter, Trial Focuses on Drug Policy: Fresno State Had a Double Standard Based on
Gender, Lawyers Say, FRESNO BEE, Nov. 14, 2007, at A1.
 89. Anteola, Ex-Bulldogs Coach, supra note 78.
90. Johnson-Klein Order, supra note 85, at 27.
91. In an email to Scott Johnson, Johnson-Klein described the catch-22 in her own words: “I was 
hired to do a job and you knew exactly who you were getting.  Now I am told I misrepresent the 
University, that my clothing is inappropriate?  There is lace on my chest, etc.? Are you kidding
me?”  Fontana & Hoagland, supra note 73.
92. Johnson-Klein Order, supra note 85, at 22; George Hostetter, Johnson-Klein Tells Her Side in
Court: Ex-Fresno State Coach Testifies About Groping, Criticism, Painkiller, FRESNO BEE, Nov. 1, 2007, at
A1. 
93. $14 million of the jury’s $19.1 million figure was compensation for past and future
emotional harm.  Hostetter, Jury Award Cut, supra note 13, at A1.
 94. Hostetter, Deal Is Reached, supra note 13, at A1. 
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coaches, had a meeting with FGCU’s former athletic director (the director
emerita), Merrily Dean Baker, and enlisted her support in efforts to address 
discriminatory treatment against female coaches and student-athletes.  Soon
after the meeting, Baker wrote a letter to the university’s interim president, 
Richard Pegnetter, summarizing the coaches’ concerns.95 Baker’s letter 
characterized the athletic department’s workplace culture as one of
“intimidation,” “isolation,” “intolerance,” and “insensitivity.”96  Baker criticized
the athletic director for failing to hire female coaches, failing to support female
coaches, using closed searches to make hiring decisions in the department,
paying female coaches lower salaries under shorter employment contracts, and
directing hostility toward a coach because of her sexual orientation.97  The letter 
also detailed disparities in the resources allocated to the men’s and women’s
programs.98 
In their eventual lawsuit, the coaches alleged that soon after Baker’s letter 
was delivered, they were presumed to be the source of the information it 
contained and were targeted for retaliation as a result.99  Specifically, soon after
the letter was delivered, both head coaches received negative performance 
evaluations for the first time ever and Flood was placed on administrative leave 
for what FGCU publically described as “issues involving student welfare.”100 
The basis for this action was revealed to be a claim that Flood had 
inappropriately tugged at a player’s shirt during practice.101 
FGCU’s response to the substance of Baker’s letter was also controversial. 
In January 2008, an outside law firm hired by FGCU to conduct an external
review of the athletic department’s Title IX compliance concluded that the
specific grievances Baker alleged did not constitute actual Title IX violations.102 
However, the report does not address a major theme in Baker’s letter: the 
hostile, intimidating atmosphere for female coaches.103 The external
investigation did, however, discredit the negative performance evaluations that
95. Letter from Merrily Dean Baker, Dir. Emerita, Fla. Gulf Coast Univ. Athletics, to Richard 





99. First Amended Complaint at 8-11, Flood v. Bd. of Trs. of the Fla. Gulf Coast Univ., No. 2:08-
cv-30-FtM-34-MMH-DNF (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2008) [hereinafter Flood and Vaughn Complaint]. 
100. Id. at 10-11, 15.
101. Id. at 16.
102. See LITTLER MENDELSON, REPORT TO FLORIDA GULF COAST UNIVERSITY: TITLE IX COMPLIANCE
REVIEW IN RESPONSE TO THE COMPLAINT OF JAYE FLOOD (Jan. 18, 2008), http://web.naplesnews.com/
static/ pdf/npdn/2008/01/fgcu/REDACTED-Complaint-Flood.pdf.
103. The external investigation report documented FGCU’s compliance with Title IX’s
requirements for equitable treatment of men’s and women’s programs, including access to facilities, 
coaching, publicity, etc.  The report also concluded that the lack of female head coaches (only 2) was 
not the result of discrimination by the athletic director.  The external investigation report
documented FGCU’s compliance with Title IX’s requirements for equitable treatment of men’s and
women’s programs, including access to facilities, coaching, publicity, etc.  The report also concluded 
that, although only one woman had been hired as a head coach in the past 12 months, this was not 
the result of discrimination.  Id. at 22-23.
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Flood and Vaughn had received and failed to substantiate the “shirt tugging 
incident” as grounds for disciplinary action.104 Moreover, the law firm’s 
investigation uncovered evidence suggesting that the Athletic Director and 
another athletic department official likely created the negative performance 
evaluations as pretextual grounds to fire the coaches in the future.105 
The external investigation report contained one final twist.  It revealed that
FGCU was concerned about more than just the shirt tugging incident: there
were also charges that Flood had inappropriate sexual contact with a female
person not associated with the University while on a volleyball road trip106 and 
that she had been in an inappropriate, “amorous” relationship with a female
student intern.107  The report concluded that this latter charge was substantiated 
by evidentiary support, and this conclusion provided the basis for FGCU’s 
decision to terminate Flood four days later.108 
While Flood publically denied that she had had an affair with a student,
her lawsuit challenging her termination focused on the reason for FGCU’s
investigation in the first place.109  Flood maintained that the investigations into
her personal life were, like the negative performance evaluations, part of the  
athletic department’s efforts to “manufacture grounds for her removal”110 
because she had participated in efforts to expose gender disparities which she 
reasonably believed to constitute sex discrimination in violation of Title IX. 
Holly Vaughn joined Flood’s lawsuit as a second plaintiff in May 2008.111 
Vaughn had resigned at the beginning of her fall 2007 season in response to the 
104. LITTLER MENDELSON, REPORT TO FLORIDA GULF COAST UNIVERSITY: INVESTIGATION #2
(Jan.18, 2008), http://web.naplesnews.com/static/pdf/npdn/2008/01/fgcu/REDACTED-Flood-
Inv2.pdf; see also Statement of President Wilson W. Bradshaw on FGCU Athletics Investigation,
January 22, 2008 (“[S]uch action did not rise to a level warranting disciplinary action against Ms. 
Flood. The investigation revealed that the student-athlete said she was not offended by the
incident[.]”). 
105. LITTLER MENDELSON, REPORT TO FLORIDA GULF COAST UNIVERSITY: COACH JAYE FLOOD’S 
COMPLAINT OF RETALIATION (Jan. 18, 2008), http://web.naplesnews.com/static/pdf/npdn/
2008/01/fgcu/REDACTED-Complaint-Flood.pdf.  A few months prior to giving Flood her first
negative performance evaluation, upon inquiry to the university’s general counsel, Intercollegiate
Athletics Director Carl McAloose and Senior Woman Administrator Kathy Peterson were informed
that Flood’s personnel file, lacking a negative performance evaluation, would not support a decision
to fire her at that time.  Peterson also admitted to the investigators that she did not like Flood and 
that she would have given a positive evaluation to any other employee who gave the same
performance as Flood.  Id.; see also Brad Kane, Inquiry: FGCU Officials Tried to Fire Coach a Year Ago:
Investigation Shows Assistant Athletic Director Changed Evaluation in Attempt to Oust Volleyball Coach, 
NAPLES DAILY NEWS, Feb. 8, 2008, available at http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2008/feb/08/ 
inquiry-fgcu-officials-tried-fire-coach-year-ago/. 
106. LITTLER MENDELSON, REPORT TO FLORIDA GULF COAST UNIVERSITY: INVESTIGATION #1
(Jan.18, 2008).
 107. LITTLER MENDELSON, REPORT TO FLORIDA GULF COAST UNIVERSITY: INVESTIGATION #3
(Jan.18, 2008) at 3; see also Kane, supra note 105.
 108. Kane, supra note 105.
109. Flood and Vaughn Complaint, supra note 99, at 17.
110. Id.  In support of this claim, Flood alleged that the Athletic Director was speaking to a male 
volleyball coach about her position even before the external investigation report findings had been 
released. Id. at 18.
111. See id.

















   
 






   
  
  




   





   
 
    
 
 SIDELINED 17 
hostility and pressure directed at her following the release of the Baker letter.112 
Vaughn maintained that her negative performance evaluation was retaliation for 
her presumed role in the Baker meeting as well as her past efforts to challenge 
the athletic department’s discriminatory employment practices.113 
FGCU’s former general counsel, Wendy Morris, was the third plaintiff to
bring a retaliation case against the university in the wake of the Baker letter.114 
According to Morris’s complaint, filed in April 2008, the former interim 
president, Richard Pegnetter, targeted her for retaliation because she had urged
him to investigate and take seriously the charges of sex discrimination raised in 
the Baker letter.115  Pegnetter refused to let Morris’s office participate in the 
internal investigation.  She was suspended, then fired, soon after she reported to
the Board of Trustees her suspicions that Pegnetter was attempting to cover up
Title IX violations.116 
In October 2008, Flood and Vaughn agreed to drop their case against FGCU
in exchange for a combined total payment of $3.4 million and FGCU’s
agreement to submit to an independent review of its Title IX compliance.117 
FGCU also settled with Wendy Morris for $800,000.118  Most recently,  a  fourth  
plaintiff, former provost Bonnie Yegidis, has come forward alleging that her 
112. Id. at 10-122.  Assistant Coach LeAnn Freeland also resigned.  Id. at 11.  Assistant Coach
Carrie Lundy took over the head volleyball coach position on an interim basis.  Despite a 7-1 record, 
she was not considered a final candidate for the permanent head coach position.  Dana Caldwell,
Volleyball: FGCU Not Offering Its Head Coaching Job Until Next Week, NAPLES DAILY NEWS, Apr. 25,
2008, available at http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2008/apr/25/volleyball-fgcu-not-offering-its-
head-coaching-job/. 
113. Flood and Vaughn Complaint, supra note 99, at 8-11.  Vaughn alleged that throughout the
course of her seven years as head coach of the women’s golf team, she had complained to athletic
director McAloose that she had not been offered additional job duties to allow her to qualify as a 
full-time employee, although several male coaches had received such offers.  She also complained
that she and other female coaches received inferior office arrangements, that she lacked 
administrative support, and that she, unlike male coaches, was not permitted to select her own
assistant coach but was instructed to “give . . . things to do” to the male assistant of the athletic 
director’s choosing. Id. at 7-8.
114. Verified Complaint at 7-17, Morris v. Bd. of Trs. of Fla. Gulf Coast Univ., No. 2:08-CV-315-
FtM-34DNF (M.D. Fla. April 17, 2008).
115. Morris was not consulted about the university’s official response to the letter, which Morris 
points out, quickly labeled Baker’s claims “unsubstantiated” before conducting any internal
investigation into their veracity.  Morris could not even obtain a copy of the Baker letter, despite
requests.  Id. at 10. 
116. Id. at 13, 15.  Morris was fired, she alleged, because her communication to the Trustees
violated a gag order that Pegnetter imposed on Morris earlier that year.  Morris maintained that the 
gag order was itself a retaliatory response to her advising the Athletics Director that he could not
lawfully fire volleyball coach Jaye Flood based on the present contents of her file. Id. at 5, 6.
117. Dana Caldwell & Tom Hanson, FGCU, Former Coaches Reach $3.4 M Settlement, NAPLES
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 15, 2008, available at http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2008/oct/15/fgcu-
reaches-settlement-former-volleyball-coach/.  Flood’s share is $2.965 million and Vaughn’s is
$435,000.  FGCU also agreed to submit to a review of Title IX compliance by an independent expert.
Id.
 118. Tom Hanson, FGCU Doles Out $800,000 to Settle Another Lawsuit, NAPLES DAILY NEWS, Oct.
16, 2008, available at http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2008/oct/16/fgcu-doles-out-800000-settle-
another-discriminatio/. 
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resignation was requested in response to her efforts to support Morris and the 
female coaches.119  Her suit is pending. 
C. Other Settled and Decided Cases 
1. U.C. Berkeley
In July 2007, the Regents of the University of California agreed to pay more
than $3.5 million to Karen Moe Humphreys to settle a wrongful termination 
lawsuit she had filed against the University of California, Berkeley and its
athletic director, Steve Gladstone.120  Humphreys, an Olympic gold medalist and
former head coach of Berkeley’s women’s swim team, had served as the
assistant athletic director for student services from 1993 until the position was
eliminated in 2004.121  Humphreys alleged that before she was terminated, she 
was passed over to fill a newly-created position as assistant athletic director for 
compliance, in favor of a man who did not have Humphreys’s experience or
seniority.122  Humphreys argued that her position was targeted for elimination 
and that she was overlooked for the new position because she had complained
to university investigators about the athletic director’s unfair treatment of 
female employees—including failure to consider or promote women to senior 
positions—and a hostile work environment for women in the athletic
department.123 She also claimed that the retaliation she experienced was due in 
part to her complaints to university officials about the department’s violation of
certain NCAA rules regarding financial aid.124  Humphreys further alleged that 
male supervisors told her that she was “intimidating” and “too strong for a
woman.”125  According to Humphreys, after the layoff was announced, another 
119. Complaint at 6-8, Yegidis v. Bd. of Trs. of Fla. Gulf Coast Univ., No. 2:09-cv-353-FtM-99DNF
(M.D. Fla. June 3, 2009).
120. Amended Complaint at 1, Humphreys v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. C-04-3808, at 2
(N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Humphreys Complaint]; Richard C. Paddock, U.C. to Pay Ex-
Coach Millions in Bias Suit, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2007, at B4.
121. Id. at 1.
122. Id. at 3-6.
123. Id. at 3-4.  The university interviewed Humphreys as part of a university investigation into a
male athletic department employee’s claims of race discrimination. Id. at 3.  Humphreys’s comments
caused the investigators to expand their investigation to include sex discrimination as well, and their 
reports (which included Humphreys’s comments and attributed them to her) recommended that
Gladstone take certain steps to remediate the hostile climate for women.  Id.  Humphreys was passed
over for the open position and targeted for elimination after the investigation concluded and 
Gladstone had received that report.  Id. at 3-4.
124. Id. at 7-10.
125. Id. at 7.  It is fitting that the phrase “too strong for a woman” would appear in a complaint 
seeking enforcement of Title IX, as that phrase has been cited as the catalyst for Title IX itself.  In 
1969, a colleague of Bernice Sandler offered it as an explanation for why she would not get the
teaching position for which she had applied.  Inspired by that incident, Sandler became an activist
and coordinated a national campaign to eradicate sex discrimination in education, a campaign that
led to the introduction and enactment of Title IX.  See  BERNICE SANDLER, “TOO STRONG FOR A
WOMAN”: THE FIVE WORDS THAT CREATED TITLE IX (1997), available at http://
www.bernicesandler.com/id44.htm. 
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told her that he hoped she would retire or take a settlement because her 
husband “makes good money” so she “really does not need to work.”126 
2. San Diego State University
In September 2008, San Diego State University announced it would pay
$1.45 million to former swimming and diving head coach Deena Deardurff
Schmidt in settlement of her Title IX retaliation case against the university.127 
Schmidt’s lawsuit alleged that the university’s failure to renew her contract as
head coach of the women’s swimming and diving program—ostensibly for 
failing to produce a winning team—was the result of unrealistic expectations, as 
her team had lacked a permanent facility since the university demolished the 
pool in 1999.128  She alleged that her termination was actually in retaliation for 
complaining to the athletic director about the lack of a pool, gender inequities in
head coaches’ salaries, and the athletic director’s failure to award her a multi-
year employment contract.  Schmidt’s complaint also detailed how her efforts to 
raise funds for the new pool construction resulted in an incident of sexual
harassment by a prospective donor.129  After terminating Schmidt, SDSU hired a 
male coach to head the swimming and diving team, reducing the number of 
female head coaches at SDSU to four of out of sixteen teams (of which ten are 
women’s sports).130 
3. Iowa State University 
In November 2008, an Iowa state trial court jury awarded $287,000 to 
former Iowa State University softball coach Ruth Crowe.131  In her Title IX
retaliation suit against the university, Crowe had alleged that after nine years in
the head coach position, the university dismissed her before her contract expired
because she had complained about salary discrimination and the university’s
126. Humphreys Complaint, supra note 120, at 7.
 127. Brett Schrotenboer, SDSU, Ex-Swim Coach Reach $1.45 Million Settlement, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Sept. 26, 2008, at D1.
128. Complaint, at 4-5, 7, Schmidt v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ., No. 37-2007-00081372-CU-
OE-CTL (Superior Court San Diego County Nov. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Schmidt Complaint]. Until the 
new facility finally opened in March 2007, a total of six different facilities substituted for a home
pool, including one in a dangerous, high-crime area of San Diego. Id. at 4-5.  Schmidt alleged that
the prolonged absence of a permanent swim facility made recruiting difficult and caused 
irregularities and interruptions to the team’s training.  Id. at 5.  The swimming and diving program
finished last in its conference for five years.  Schrotenboer, supra note 127, at D1.
129. Schmidt Complaint, supra note 128, at 6, 8.  Schmidt’s efforts to raise funds for a new pool led
to an incident of sexual harassment. A potential donor who had made contributions to athletics in
the past “repeatedly physically grabbed her and promised to donate money to construct a new pool 
if she would have sex with him.”  Schmidt alleges that the athletic director told her that she “needed
to deal with it” and did nothing to stop the donor’s conduct. Id. at 4.
130. San Diego State University Athletics Official Site, http://goaztecs.cstv.com/ (last accessed
Oct. 17, 2009).
 131. Tom Witosky, Ex-ISU Coach Awarded $287,000, DES MOINES REG., Nov 23, 2008, at 1C.  The 
jury’s verdict amounted to $90,000 in back pay, $160,000 for past emotional distress, and $37,000 for 
future distress. Id.  Iowa State dropped its appeal of the jury verdict in a $425,000 settlement that
included attorney’s fees.  Tom Witosky, ISU, Fired Coach Reach Settlement, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 15,
2009, at 1B.
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20 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 17:1 2010
failure to allocate comparable money for recruiting female athletes.132  The  
university argued at trial that retaliation was not the motive for Crowe’s
termination.  Rather, she was fired because of an overall losing record and
complaints by athletes and parents.133  However, in finding ISU liable, the jury
signaled its conclusion that this explanation was pretext for a retaliatory motive. 
4. San Diego Mesa College 
In July 2008, Lorri Sulpizio and Cathy Bass sued San Diego Mesa College
for direct discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title IX.134 Sulpizio,
formerly the head women’s basketball coach, and Bass, the director of basketball 
operations, were fired after seven years of service, they alleged, because they 
challenged discriminatory treatment of their team.  This discrimination included
the dedication of their team’s locker room to visiting football teams during a 
November invitational, disruptions to their practices by the men’s football team, 
and other inequities.135  Sulpizio and Bass also maintained that the Athletic
Director’s decision to fire them reflected discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. They were terminated soon after an Athletic Director who had 
allegedly investigated and inquired about Sulpizio’s sexual orientation and 
expressed concern about the lesbian “image” of the team identified the two as
domestic partners in a local news story.136  In December 2009, a jury awarded 
Lorri Sulpizio $28,000 in damages after finding that her termination had been
retaliatory. The jury did not find sufficient evidence to support her claim of 
sexual orientation discrimination, however.137 
5. University of Nevada, Reno 
The one post-Jackson retaliation case to generate an unfavorable decision for
a female plaintiff was Terri Patraw’s lawsuit against University of Nevada, 
Reno. In May 2009, a state trial court dismissed Patraw’s claim that she had
been fired from her position of head women’s soccer coach in August 2007,138 in 
retaliation for blowing the whistle on NCAA violations committed by the men’s 
golf coach139 and for complaining on numerous occasions to the athletic director 
132. Witosky, Ex-ISU Coach, supra note 131.
 133. Witosky, ISU, Fired Coach, supra note 131.
134. Verified Complaint, Sulpizio v. San Diego Mesa College, No. 37-2008-00088329-CU-CR-CTL 
(Cal. Super. July 24, 2008).
135. In September 2008, OCR confirmed these and other Title IX violations at San Diego Mesa.
Brent Schrotenboer, Mesa to Solve Title IX Issues, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 17, 2008, at D6.
136. See Jill Lieber Steeg, Disputes Reflect Continuing Tension Over Title IX, USA TODAY, May 13,
2008, at 1A; Website of the National Center for Lesbian Rights – Sulpizio and Bass v. San Diego Mesa
College, http://www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=issue_caseDocket_sulpizio. 
137. Brent Schrotenboer, Former Coach at Mesa Wins Title IX Based Suit, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., 
Dec. 4, 2009, at D4.
138. Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, Patraw v. Groth, Nos. CV07-02585 & CV08-
00826 (Washoe Cty. Dist. Ct., May 5, 2009) [hereinafter Patraw Order]. Amended Complaint at 4, 
Patraw v. Groth, No. CV07-02585 (Washoe Cty. Dist. Ct., Dec. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Patraw 
Complaint].  Patraw sought reinstatement in an administrative complaint filed with the Nevada State
Department of Personnel, under Nevada’s whistleblower protection law, NRS 281.641.
139. Patraw Complaint, supra note 138, at 1-5.  Patraw had reported Rich Merritt for giving players
unauthorized kickbacks (paying them above the prevailing wage for babysitting, giving one athlete 
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and other athletic department officials about sexual harassment and disparate 
treatment for the women’s soccer team and women’s sports at UNR.  These 
complaints addressed inequities in locker room access and the scheduling of 
practice facilities as well as inequities in the salaries and employment
perquisites like courtesy cars.140  Oddly, however, nowhere in the judge’s 36-
page order of dismissal does he address Patraw’s Title IX retaliation claim as 
such. Instead, he reasoned that her Title IX claim was not actionable because it
failed to allege protected speech within the meaning of the First Amendment—a 
standard no court has applied to Title IX claims.141  In light of this clear  
divergence from other courts, the decision may be vulnerable on appeal, if one is
forthcoming.
D. Other Pending Cases 
1. Feather River College 
Feather River College, a community college in Quincy, California, is
presently defending charges of unlawful sex discrimination and retaliation in 
several lawsuits.  Two of the three plaintiffs are former athletic department 
personnel, including its former athletic director, Paul Thein, and its one-time
women’s basketball coach, Laurel Wartluft.142  Thein and Wartluft had urged 
FRC President Susan Carroll to commit the college to Title IX compliance.  This
would entail restructuring the way the athletic department raised and
distributed funds for athletics, instituting parity in the classification and 
compensation of men’s and women’s coaches, and expanding opportunities for 
female athletes.  As a result of this advocacy,143 Wartluft, who had been serving
as the interim women’s basketball coach, was passed over by the hiring
his personal frequent flyer miles) and gambling with his players.  Id. at 4-5.  Merritt, who has since 
resigned, was cleared of the gambling charge, but the NCAA continued to investigate the others. 
Staff Report, Merritt Resigns, NEVADA SAGEBRUSH, May 16, 2008, available at http://
nevadasagebrush.com/blog/2008/05/16/merritt-resigns/.
140. Patraw Complaint, supra note 138, at 1-3.
141. Patraw Order, supra note 138, at 5-12.  Later in the order, while analyzing Patraw’s Equal
Protection claim, the judge concluded that the university satisfactorily alleged permissible reasons 
for terminating her contract—specifically, that she had tendered and withdrawn her resignation on a
number of past occasions and that she continued to dwell on a past, romantic relationship she had 
had with an assistant men’s basketball coach—but did not include any analysis of whether these
reasons could have been pretextual under the familiar McDonnell-Douglas standard that courts 
regularly apply in Title IX retaliation cases, concluding only that Patraw had not offered specific
evidence of pretext. Id. at 14-16.
142. Complaint at 2, Thein v. Feather River Cmty. Coll., No 2:06-cv-01777-FCD-GGH (E.D. Cal. 
Aug. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Thein Complaint]; Complaint at 2, Wartluft v. Feather River Cmy. Coll.
Dist., No. 2:07-cv-02023-FCD-GGH (E.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Wartluft Complaint]. 
The third plaintiff is Michelle Jaureguito, formerly the federal grant director.  While her case does
not relate to athletics, she reported to Thein, and Thein alleges that his termination is in part
retaliation for his support of Jaureguito after she blew the whistle on a staff member who allegedly 
served alcohol to minors and engaged in sexual misconduct.  Thein Complaint, supra, at 5–6.
143. Wartluft Complaint, supra note 142, at 4-7.  Wartluft also alleges that sexual orientation
discrimination factored into the committee’s decision, as one of its member’s referred to her as “a
closet lesbian.” Id. at 7. A similar anti-gay sentiment was also reflected in President Carroll’s alleged 
comments to Thein that Wartluft would not fit in with the college community “because she [is] a
lesbian.”  Id. at 8.
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22 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 17:1 2010
committee charged with recommending a candidate to fill the permanent 
position.144  Thein then took the unusual but arguably authorized step of
disregarding the committee’s recommendation and hiring Wartluft anyway.145 
President Carroll, in response, “deleted” Wartluft’s position and reassigned her
coaching duties.  Meanwhile, an unscheduled review of Thein resulted in a 
negative evaluation, the first of his career, which Carroll then cited as the basis 
for her decision to place him on administrative leave for the remaining months 
of his contract. 
Thein and Wartluft have each brought Title IX-retaliation claims against
FRC in federal court.146  Each has also sued FRC in state court under California’s 
Fair Housing and Employment Act.  In addition, both plaintiffs have filed claims
with the California State Personnel Board, which has jurisdiction to adjudicate
whistleblower complaints against state employers.147  The SPB held a hearing on 
Wartluft and Thein’s claims in the summer of 2007; the parties have submitted 
post-hearing pleadings and are currently awaiting the board’s decision. 
2. Montana State University
In 2004, Montana State University terminated head coach Robin Potera-
Haskins after three years of successful service148 at the helm of the women’s  
basketball program.149  Potera-Haskins sued in June 2005, alleging that she was 
fired in retaliation for complaining about gender inequities within the athletic
department.150  Specifically, Potera-Haskins had lodged regular protests with the 
athletic director and other senior officials about disparities in compensation
(Potera-Haskins’s salary was 30% less than that of the men’s basketball coach)
and support for the women’s basketball team in comparison to the men’s
(including promotion and publicity, funding for hosting tournaments, and 
access to the weight training facility and medical trainers).151  MSU defended 
that Potera-Haskins was terminated because of her “abrasive” style that, while 
144. Id. at 7.
145. Thein Complaint, supra note 142, at 4.
146. Id., at 9; see also Wartluft Complaint, supra note 142, at 11.
147. The SPB’s jurisdiction expressly includes whistleblower complaints against community 
colleges, but not the University of California and the California State University systems.  See
http://www.spb.ca.gov/legal/appeals/faq.htm#q3.
148. Hired to coach a team that had not posted a winning season in two years, Potera-Haskins 
coached her team to back to back co-conference championships and three winning seasons.
Amended Complaint at 3-4, Potera-Haskins v. Gamble, No. CV05-22-BU-JEIT (D. Mont. July 1, 2005)
[hereinafter Potera-Haskins Complaint]. 
149. Id. at 3.
150. Id. at 19.
151. Id. at 5–6.  Moreover, Potera-Haskins alleges that she was targeted for retaliation because
she resisted pressure from Athletic Director Peter Fields to offer a spot on the team to his daughter, a
Division II player whose talent and physical ability Potera-Haskins did not believe was well-suited 
for Division I.  Potera-Haskins did eventually recruit Fields’s daughter to the team and awarded her
a scholarship; she alleges the fear of reprisal from the Athletic Director motivated these decisions. 
Id. at 7–9; see also Associated Press, Judge Reduces Suit by Ex-MSU Coach, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Oct. 4,
2007 (identifying the player in question—referred to in the complaint as “Field’s acquaintance”—as
his daughter).  She further alleges that Fields intervened in Potera-Haskins’s management of the
team to benefit his daughter.  For example, after Potera-Haskins assigned Fields’s daughter to extra
shooting practice, Fields curtailed such practices. Potera-Haskins Complaint, supra note 148, at 10–11.
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producing wins, also garnered complaints from players and parents and 
compelled several players to quit the team.152  In 2007, the district court granted 
MSU’s motion to dismiss Potera-Haskins’s Title VII and First Amendment
claims,153 but agreed that Potera-Haskins’s factual allegations could, if proven,
give rise to liability under Title IX on a retaliation theory.154 
3. University of Tennessee at Martin 
In May 2008, Amy Draper, formerly the head volleyball coach at the
University of Tennessee at Martin, sued the university in federal court.155 
Draper alleges that she was terminated in retaliation for complaining to the 
athletic director about inferior treatment of her team and of female coaches.156 
Such inferior treatment was evidenced by the volleyball team’s exclusion from
the campus’s premier athletic facility, which resulted in the need to share a 
facility with intramurals and physical education classes.157  She also objected to 
what she perceived as discriminatory treatment by the assistant athletic director
who serves as the Senior Women’s Administrator158 and to the department’s 
practice of requiring female coaches, but not male coaches, to have playing 
experience in the sports that they coach.159  Draper maintains that when she 
pointed out these gender disparities in an email to the athletic director, she was 
told that if she continued to make allegations of gender discrimination, he 
would “bring the curtain down” on her.160  She was eventually fired before the
end of her contract and without a hearing, for reasons the university claims are 
related to her team’s “poor performance.”161  Draper alleges that this rationale, if
true, constitutes a double standard, as the department chooses to retain several 
male coaches who have never had a winning season.162 This case is in discovery.
No dispositive motions have been filed, nor has a trial date been set.
4. Texas Southern University
Surina Dixon sued Texas Southern University in October 2008, alleging that
she was fired from the head women’s basketball coach position to which she 
had recently been hired after insisting on contract terms equivalent to that of the
newly hired men’s basketball coach.163  The athletic director allegedly told Dixon 
152. Gary Jacobson, Potera-Haskins Fighting to Clear the Record, Get Back on Division I Track, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 25, 2007, at 17C.
153. Potera-Haskins v. Gamble, 519 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115-19 (D. Mont. 2007).
154. Id. 
155. Complaint, Draper v. University of Tenn., No. 1:08-cv-01125-JDB (W.D. Tenn. May 28, 2008)
[hereinafter Draper Complaint]. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 7.
158. Id. at 5–8.
159. Specifically, she points out that men have been hired to coach women’s sports such as 
softball, volleyball, and basketball.  Id. at 7.
160. Id. at 8.
161. Id. at 11, 13.
162. Id. at 14.
163. Complaint, Dixon v. Tex. S. Univ., No. 4:2008cv02893 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2008).
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24 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 17:1 2010
the one-year contract term was necessary until she could “prove herself.”164 
Dixon maintains, however, that the less experienced men’s basketball coach who 
was hired did not have to prove himself; he was hired with a five-year contract 
and a salary twice as high as hers.165 
PART III 
RETALIATION CASES AND BARRIERS TO WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP IN COLLEGE 
ATHLETICS
As noted in the Introduction, women are the minority among college
coaches, constituting less than a quarter of head coaches overall and less than 
half of coaches of women’s teams.166  Similarly, less than a quarter of all athletic
directors are women; this percentage drops to below 10% among colleges and 
universities belonging to NCAA Division I.167  In contrast, before Title IX was 
passed in 1972, women’s sports were coached and administered almost entirely
by women, causing some to describe today’s dearth of female coaches as an 
“unintended consequence”168 of Title IX.  It is argued that the legislation  
elevated the profile and status of women’s sports, with different impacts on men 
and women regarding leadership positions: greater prestige and compensation
make such positions increasingly attractive to men, while simultaneously
generating additional pressure, time, and travel demands that make those 
positions less attractive to women.169  Accordingly, a popular explanation for the
gender gap in college coaching and administration is that women leave or avoid 
164. Id. at 14.
165. Id. at 15.  Citing TSU’s own finding of gender inequity submitted to the NCAA, Dixon
maintains that pay discrimination reflects a pattern of discrimination against female coaches at TSU.
Id. at 12.
166. Today the number of intercollegiate women’s teams—9101, or 8.65 per school—is at an all-
time high, but the percentage of female head coaches for women’s teams is 42.8%, only slightly
higher than the lowest-ever 42.6% reported in 2006.  CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 16.  Recent  
data showing that women have garnered only 10% of available head coaching positions for women’s
intercollegiate teams since 2000 suggests that the gender gap is widening rather than closing.  Megan
Cooper et al., Women in Coaching: Exploring Female Athletes’ Interest in the Profession, CHRONICLE OF
KINESIOLOGY & PHYSICAL EDUC., May 2007, at 8.  Moreover, there is evidence that women are 
concentrated in the lower status head coaching positions, such as part-time positions and positions 
in Division III programs. ROBERT DRAGO ET AL., FINAL REPORT FOR CAGE: THE COACHING AND
GENDER EQUITY PROJECT 39-41 (2005), available at http://lsir.la.psu.edu/workfam/CAGE.htm.  More
than half of women in coaching are part-time or part-year, compared to one-third of male coaches. 
Id. at 40. Division III has a higher percentage of female coaches (46.6%) than either Division I or 
Division II (interestingly, however, it is Division II (33.5%), rather than Division I (44.4%), that has 
the lowest percentage of female head coaches).  CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 16. 
167. CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 16.
168. See, e.g., Bob Keisser, Coaching: Title IX’s Unwanted Side-Effect, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, 
June 12, 2003, at B9 (“‘It’s an unintended consequence,’ said UCLA women’s Athletic Director Betsy 
Stephensen[.]”); see also Robin Wilson, Where Have All the Women Gone?, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED., May
4, 2007, at A40 (quoting Professor Deborah Rhode in characterizing the “declining proportion of
female coaches [as] an ‘ironic byproduct’ of Title IX.”). 
169. See, e.g., DRAGO ET AL., supra note 166, at 12-13.
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careers in college athletics as a matter of personal preference170 for jobs that are 
more family-friendly;171 indeed, there is empirical evidence to support this 
theory.172  Unfortunately, the predominance of this explanation for the gender
gap in college coaching creates the perception that college athletics departments
are limited in their ability to address the problem because head coach and 
upper-level administration positions are, due to long hours and travel
requirements, family-unfriendly by their very nature.173  Yet what these 
retaliation cases reveal is that other gendered dynamics of college athletic
170. Traditional notions of gender roles dictate that women will be primary caregivers to their 
children and families, whereas men are breadwinners.  See, e.g., Melanie Dixon & Jennifer Bruening, 
Perspectives on Work-Family Conflict in Sport: An Integrated Approach, 8 SPORT MGMT. REV. 227, 243-44
(2005).
171. Linda J. Carpenter & R. Vivian Acosta, Status of Women in Athletics: Changes and Causes, 56 J.
OF PHYSICAL EDUC. RECREATION & DANCE 35, 36 (1988) (male athletic directors believed that family 
obligations were one of the primary reasons why there are not more women in coaching); see also
Jane Stangl & Mary Jo Kane, Structural Variables that Offer Explanatory Power for the 
Underrepresentation of Women Coaches Since Title IX: The Case of Homologous Reproduction, 8 SOC. OF
SPORT J. 47, 48-49 (1991) (citing a study showing male athletic directors’ beliefs, based on gender 
stereotypes, about constraints on women); Sean Gregory, Where Are the Women Coaches?, TIME, Aug.
16, 2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1653648,00.html; Wilson, 
supra note 168, at A40.
172. For example, in a recent NCAA study, about a third of female coaches surveyed (32%)
reported lack of a work-life balance.  Similarly, 35% of coaches ranked family commitments as the 
most common reason why women don’t go into coaching.  NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS ASS’N,
GENDER EQUITY IN COL. COACHING AND ADMIN.: PERCEIVED BARRIERS REPORT at 18, 20 (Jan. 2009); see
also Rhode & Walker, supra note 47, at 24-25 (a higher percentage of female coaches (36%) than male
coaches (19%) considered flexibility for family a “very important” or “most important” job resource); 
DRAGO ET AL., supra note 166, at 12-13, 18 (explaining that coaching is a profession with an “ideal 
worker norm” largely incompatible with family commitments and that those responsibilities still 
tend to disproportionately fall on women, while male coaches enjoy a “daddy privilege” in the form 
of “greater latitude to meet work/life demands either through having a spouse or because they were
praised for attending to the needs of their family”). 
However, while it is clear that family considerations factor into women’s decisions to leave and enter
coaching and athletics administration, there is also evidence to suggest that other considerations are 
equally or even more important.  For example, Rhode and Walker, supra note 47, at 27–28, report
that 83% of coaches of women’s sports who responded to their survey agreed or strongly agreed 
with the statement “my job provides enough flexibility to allow me to take care of my familial and 
other personal responsibilities” and that there was no significant difference between male and
female respondents.  By comparison, no other positive statements about the state of the athletic
program received as much support; for example, only 62% agreed or strongly agreed that resources 
were allocated fairly between men’s and women’s athletics, and 56% agreed or strongly agreed that 
their programs received the resources necessary for success.  Id. at 28.  Moreover, other studies have
found that male coaches are more likely than female coaches to leave coaching because of the job’s
incompatibility with family life. See Cynthia Hasbrook et al., Sex Bias and the Validity of Believed 
Differences Between Male and Female Interscholastic Athletic Coaches, 61 RES. Q. FOR EXERCISE & SPORT
259, 264-65 (1990) (also citing other studies finding similarly); see also Cindra Kamphoff & Diane Gill, 
Collegiate Athletes Perceptions of the Coaching Profession, 3 INT’L J. OF SPORTS SCIENCE & COACHING 55, 
67 (2008) (finding male and female student athletes responded similarly about how time
commitments and family obligations would influence their decision to go into coaching). 
173. This is not to say that leadership positions in college athletics could not be made more 
family-friendly.  See, e.g., Rhode & Walker, supra note 47, at 41 (suggesting such measures as 
adequate family leave; flexible time commitments such as part-time, job-sharing, and flex-time
initiatives; child-care subsidies and other assistance; and work schedules and meeting times that
take into consideration coaches’ family obligations).  ` 
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department culture are also operating as obstacles to women’s participation and
advancement in leadership positions in college athletics.  Significantly, none of
the plaintiffs described in Part II claimed retaliation predicated on
discrimination related to motherhood or family considerations.  This Part will
examine the cases with common themes along these lines, and contextualize 
these themes within the existing empirical and theoretical scholarship
examining women, leadership, and athletic department culture.  It will address 
the commonalities in the predicate discrimination (subpart A) and the retaliation
itself (subpart B), as well as themes of double binds (subparts C and D),  
homophobia (subpart E), double standards (subpart F), and the meaning of 
women’s own participation in the discrimination and retaliation against other 
women (subpart G). 
A. Predicate Discrimination Relating to Employment Conditions and
Discrimination Against Female Student Athletes 
Like Coach Jackson, all of the plaintiffs in the cases described above 
experienced retaliation (or alleged retaliation) after challenging ostensible
violations of the Title IX regulations that prohibit discrimination in the number
of or support for athletic opportunities afforded to students.  Associate Athletic
Director Milutinovich (Fresno State), for example, alleged that she was targeted 
for retaliation after she challenged her athletic department’s failure to add 
opportunities for female athletes pursuant to its agreement with OCR.
Milutinovich, like Coach Wartluft and Director Thein (Feather River), and
Coaches Flood and Vaughn (FGCU), challenged the general disparity in
resources allocated to men’s and women’s athletics.174  Coach Vivas (Fresno 
State) and Coach Draper (Tennessee-Martin) alleged they had complained that
their women’s teams could not access the university’s premier athletic facility on
the same terms as men’s teams.175  Coaches Sulpizio and Bass (San Diego Mesa), 
Coach Schmidt (San Diego State) and Coach Patraw (University of Nevada, 
Reno) challenged impairments to their access to practice facilities.176 And Coach
Crowe (Iowa State) sought a more equitable distribution of resources for
recruiting.177  These coaches’ concerns about inequitable distribution of
resources are consistent with empirical research demonstrating that this
perception is shared by a significant percentage of coaches of women’s teams.178 
174. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2009) (a university’s failure to provide necessary funds to members of 
one sex may be considered as a factor in assessing whether it has provided equal opportunities to
both sexes). 
175. Id. at § 106.41(c)(7) (factors constituting equal opportunities in athletics include equal access
to competitive facilities). 
176. Id. (factors constituting equal opportunities in athletics include equal provision of locker 
rooms and practice facilities). 
177. Id. at § 106.41(c) (“other factors” in addition to those enumerated aid in the determination of 
equal opportunities in athletics). 
178. In one study, more than a third (38%) of coaches of women’s teams who responded to a 
survey disagreed or strongly disagreed that resources were allocated fairly between men’s and
women’s teams; furthermore, the responses were similar between male and female coaches in the
study.  Rhode & Walker, supra note 47, at 27–28.  For context, coaches were more likely to agree with
positive statements about job flexibility, availability of resources to individual athletes, coaches’





   
 
























    
  
  
   
  
   
    
 SIDELINED 27 
In many of the cases included in the post-Jackson trend, employment
discrimination claims are also the predicate for plaintiffs’ alleged or experienced 
retaliation.179 Lindy Vivas filed an internal grievance challenging the shorter 
contract terms and lower salaries afforded to female coaches.180  Merrily Dean 
Baker’s letter on behalf of the FGCU coaches contained a similar complaint.181  In 
addition, Ruth Crowe, Robin Potera-Haskins, Terri Patraw, Deena Deardurff
Schmidt, Laurel Wartluft, and Surina Dixon all alleged that they experienced
retaliation for challenging, among other things, the lower salaries and shorter
contract terms they received relative to their male counterparts.182 Karen Moe
Humphreys claimed she was targeted after challenging the discriminatory 
hiring practices within her department.183 
In these ways, the cases are different from Coach Jackson’s, which did not 
include an employment discrimination claim.  In fact, it was the absence of  a  
direct discrimination claim that made his case groundbreaking for establishing 
that Title IX protects a third party who is not a direct target of sex
discrimination.  The fact that so many of the post-Jackson cases involve 
employment discrimination complaints as a predicate for retaliation exposes 
and underscores the discrimination female coaches perceive in the terms and
conditions of their employment. 
This observation is also consistent with empirical evidence that women are
over-represented in lower status, part-time coaching jobs184 and that they earn a 
lower wage per hour.185  And it is not necessarily the case that female coaches 
are self-selecting into positions with fewer hours. For instance, one of Holly 
Vaughn’s complaints against FGCU for which she experienced retaliation was 
that she was not given the same opportunity as male coaches to take on
additional job responsibilities that would have warranted greater job status and 
compensation.186 
Moreover, the centrality of employment and programmatic discrimination
to the narrative of these retaliation cases complements existing empirical 
research on the dearth of women coaches, which demonstrates a correlation
between their perceptions of discrimination on the one hand, with lower job 
satisfaction and higher turnover on the other.187  For instance, one qualitative 
access to mentoring and professional development, and support from the school’s administration
than with statements about gender equity in resource allocation.  Id. 
179. See generally 34 C.F.R § 106.51 (2009) (prohibiting educational institutions from 
discrimination on the basis of sex in the context of employment). 
180. See supra part II.A. 
181. See supra part II.B. 
182. Id. at § 106.51(b)(3) (prohibiting pay discrimination).
183. Id. at § 106.51(b)(2) (prohibiting discrimination in hiring).
 184. DRAGO ET AL., supra note 166, at 39 (reporting that there are double the number of women in 
part-time coaching positions than full-time).
185. In one study, full-time male coaches’ average annual salary was found to be 30% higher
than the average annual salary of full-time female coaches.  Male coaches had higher average hourly
earnings as well ($16.22 per hour, compared to $12.88 per hour).  DRAGO ET AL., supra note 166, at 40.
186. Flood and Vaughn Complaint, supra note 99, at 7.
187. See Sue Inglis et al., Multiple Realities of Women’s Work Experiences in Coaching and Athletic
Management, 9 WOMEN IN SPORT & PHYSICAL ACTIVITY J. 1 (2000); Annelies Knoppers et al., 
Opportunity and Work Behavior in College Coaching, 15 J. OF SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 1, 15 (1991) (female
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study of female American and Canadian intercollegiate coaches suggests that
the coaches’ perceptions of gender discrimination in athletic departments in
terms of “salary, job security, workload, historic pension contributions, team
facilities and operating budgets (e.g., travel, recruitment, scholarship monies),” 
contributes to the higher rates of job turnover among female coaches compared 
to male coaches.188 
Another study found that while both male and female coaches were likely
to report high levels of job satisfaction, and thus lower turnover intent, when
they perceived their athletic department to be distributing resources equitably 
among men’s and women’s teams in compliance with Title IX, the perception of 
equality was more predictive of female coaches’ job satisfaction than it was for 
male coaches of women’s teams.189  This difference could be due to female
coaches’ heightened awareness of inequities that affect all women’s teams,
regardless of the coaches’ sex, or it could reflect a greater incidence of
discrimination against those women’s teams with female coaches.190  Either way,
this study underscores the relationship between employment and programmatic
discrimination, as revealed in the narratives of the retaliation plaintiffs 
examined in this Article.  In addition, it sheds light on the career choices of
women as they relate to leadership in women’s sports. 
B.	 Retaliation Against Coaches and Administrators Challenging Inequalities in
Athletics 
After challenging some manner of sex discrimination in athletics—related
to salary, other employment conditions, or the allocation of resources to
women’s teams, as described above—all of the female coaches whose cases are
examined here experienced some adverse consequence related to their 
employment. These consequences included termination or nonrenewal (the 
Fresno State and FGCU plaintiffs, as well as Coaches Crowe, Schmidt, Potera-
Haskins, Draper, Sulpizio, Bass, and Patraw), transfer to another department 
(Milutinovich), failure to promote or hire (Coaches Wartluft and Humphreys),
falsified negative performance evaluations (Coaches Flood and Vaughn), and, in 
coaches are less likely than their male counterparts to anticipate a long career in coaching, a finding
the authors attributed to the female coaches’ perception of fewer opportunities for advancement); 
Michael Sagas & Frank B. Ashley, Gender Differences in the Intent to Leave Coaching: Testing the Role of
Personal, External, and Work-Related Variables, 2 INT’L J. SPORT MGMT. 297, 304 (2001) (suggesting that
female coaches’ perceptions of inequitable resources may explain job dissatisfaction and turnover).
 188. Inglis et al., supra note 187, at 13.  Female coaches’ perceptions of a glass ceiling also affects 
their turnover intentions.  See Sagas & Ashley, supra note 187, at 309 (but finding that male and
female coaches had similar perceptions of their career advancement opportunities; the difference is 
that for female coaches, negative perceptions of career advancement were more likely to translate
into turnover intent). 
It is worth noting here that such perceptions are, themselves, corroborated by findings that men are 
more likely to find more lucrative careers in coaching than women, as it has been shown that they
earn higher hourly wages. DRAGO ET AL., supra note 166, at 40.
189. Michael Sagas & Paul J. Batista, The Importance of Title IX Compliance on the Job Satisfaction and
Occupational Turnover Intent of Intercollegiate Coaches, 16 APPLIED RES. IN COACHING & ATHLETICS
ANNUAL 15, 37 (2001).
 190. Sagas & Batista, supra note 189, at 37.
































   
 
      
  
   
 
 SIDELINED 29 
two cases, an investigation for the purpose of generating an alternative ground
for termination (Coaches Flood and Johnson-Klein).
It is common for employees who challenge discrimination to experience
retaliation because those who challenge discrimination are “transgressing the 
social order.”191  To those who benefit from privilege bestowed on the basis of 
race or sex, retaliation is an effective, and thus attractive, mechanism for
sustaining the social order that creates that privilege.192 
Retaliation operates to this end by raising the cost of speaking out against 
discrimination relative to the benefit of doing so.193  Especially in small 
professions like college athletics, the risk of losing one’s job is a particularly high
cost because positions are competitive. Moreover, the insularity of college 
athletics adds to the cost of challenging discrimination because it creates the
possibility that the negative reputation as a troublemaker that a coach or 
administrator earns by whistleblowing194 could hinder her future job prospects. 
Another important characteristic of retaliation is that it is more likely to
target individuals who are not part of the dominant class.195 Women and 
persons of color, historically marginalized from athletics, are thus particularly
susceptible to reprisals when they challenge athletic departments’
discriminatory practices.  This is not to say that men do not object to sex 
discrimination or experience retaliation for doing so.  Coach Roderick Jackson’s 
case196 serves as a primary example of this point, as does Paul Thein’s case
against Feather River College.197  Another example is a case which recently 
settled against University of California at Davis that was filed by former
wrestling coach Michael Burch.  Burch was fired after—and arguably because— 
he advocated for the rights of women who wanted to continue to wrestle for the 
team after the university terminated female wrestling opportunities.198  And  
Kevin Wilson was not renewed to his position as head women’s basketball 
coach at Southern Oregon University after he protested discriminatory
distribution of budget resources, access to facilities, office space, and other 
inequities; his Title IX retaliation claim also settled.199  Despite these cases in
 191. Brake, supra note 46, at 20.
192. Generally, the beneficiaries of gender privilege, and thus, the perpetrators of retaliation, are 
likely to be men. Id. at 35 (citing findings that men were more likely than women to respond 
negatively to women who confronted sexism, due to “men’s greater inclination to punish
transgressions from expected gender roles . . . ”). In the cases examined here, women have played a 
role in retaliating against other women seeking fairness and equality.  This will be examined further 
in Part III.G, infra. 
193. Brake, supra note 46, at 25.
194. Id. at 32 (“Social psychologists have found that women and racial minorities are perceived
as troublemakers and hypersensitive when they confront discrimination.”). 
195. Brake, supra note 46, at 36 (“White persons and men are less susceptible to social costs when
they publically portray themselves as victims of race or sex discrimination.”).
196. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
197. See supra Part II.D1. 
198. Burch’s case settled for $725,000 in 2007.  Rick Del Vecchio, U.C. Davis Settles Former
Wrestling Coach’s Lawsuit for $725,000, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 20, 2007, at B3.
199. See Wilson v. S. Or. Univ., No. CV-06-3016-CO, 2006 WL 2668468, at *1 (D. Or. Sept. 15, 
2006) (issuing findings of fact and dismissing plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim because of the 
adequacy of the remedy available under Title IX); E-mail from Edward Talmadge, Esq. to Erin E.
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which men were the plaintiffs, the fact that female plaintiffs have dominated the 
trend of retaliation cases post-Jackson (even though technically, the legal
significance of the Jackson decision is to secure protection for those who are not 
also direct victims of sex discrimination200) is consistent with the view that
members of the non-dominant group are more vulnerable to retaliation.201 
Because retaliation works in the service of discrimination itself, and 
operates to the same end to secure the hierarchy of privilege, retaliation is “more 
likely to occur in organizations with a high tolerance for, and incidence of,
discrimination.”202  The existing entitlement and privilege that inures to men’s
sport, as well as its significant contribution to the gender order more
generally,203 could explain an athletic department’s decision to  favor males in  
the distribution of athletic opportunities to students, men’s teams in the 
distribution of resources, and male coaches in compensation, job security, and 
other benefits of employment.  For example, it is not surprising that the culture 
of Fresno State’s athletic department allowed for widespread Title IX violations
in the form of inequities between men’s and women’s sports, backsliding on
obligations to ameliorate the same, and reprisals against women in the athletic
department who called that backsliding into question.  The correlative desire to 
retain sport as a male preserve and sustain that hegemonic privilege, and the 
high cultural stakes of doing so, suggests why an athletic department’s 
leadership would be threatened by, and thus retaliate, against women who seek 
to challenge it. 
C. The Retaliation/Job Performance Double Bind 
Having examined generally the nature of the predicate discrimination and
the cultural context for the retaliation, this section examines how aspects of both
Buzuvis, June 24, 2009 (on file with author) (reporting that the Title IX retaliation claim “settled in 
favor of Mr. Wilson”). 
200. See supra note 44. 
201. Two other cases filed post-Jackson by male coaches also warrant mention here.  In one case,
which is pending but has survived summary judgment, a male wrestling coach claims he was
terminated (by a female athletic director) in retaliation for his advocacy of men’s wrestling.  Sabol v. 
Montclair State Univ., No. 06-3214 (DMC), 2008 WL 2354553, at *1 (D. N.J. June 3, 2008).  This is the 
only case I have found in which a male coach has claimed reprisal for challenging discrimination
directed at men’s sports.  Though it is an outlier for this reason, the low status of wrestling among
men’s sports lends support to the claim that members of the non-dominant class experience
retaliation the most. 
In another case, the male plaintiff alleged a more typical basis for retaliatory termination — his
advocacy for the women’s soccer program, which he coached.  However, the trial court dismissed 
his case after finding that the university’s decision not to renew his contract was instead triggered by
numerous complaints about his negative attitude and intimidation of his players.  Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, Swanbeck v. Minn. State Univ. Moorhead, No. C4-06-1747 (Clay County
Minn. Dist. Ct., Dec. 14, 2007).
 202. Brake, supra note 46, at 41.
 203. MICHAEL A. MESSNER, POWER AT PLAY: SPORTS AND THE PROBLEM OF MASCULINITY 16 (1992);
David Whitson, Sport in the Social Construction of Masculinity, in SPORT, MEN AND THE GENDER ORDER, 
supra note 17, at 19; see also Alina Bernstein, Is it Time for a Victory Lap? Changes in the Media Coverage
of Women in Sport, 37 INT’L REV. FOR SOC. OF SPORT 415, 415 (2002) (“A number of authors [have]
argued that, perhaps more than any other social institution, sport perpetuates male superiority and 
female inferiority.”). 
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operate simultaneously to pose obstacles to women’s success.  The relationship
between these two mechanisms for discrimination consists of a double bind, in 
which coaches are punished not only for challenging discrimination in the 
allocation of resources to their programs, but also for failing to produce 
successful programs in a short time period, despite a discriminatory allocation
of resources.204 
This bind is exacerbated by discrimination in the length of contract terms, 
discussed in the previous section.205  Hiring and renewing coaches on a one- or 
two-year basis provides athletic departments with more frequent opportunities 
to replace coaches who are not living up to their expectations, which may 
include expectations to produce winning records or nationally ranked, highly
competitive programs.206  For coaches without the job security of a longer-term
contract, one bad season may be the difference between losing and keeping 
one’s job. 
A double bind is thus created when, in addition to the job pressure created
by high expectations and a short-term contract, a coach is hamstrung by limited
resources and support, insufficient access to training and practice facilities, an
inadequate number of assistant coaches, insufficient access to scholarship 
dollars, and inadequate opportunity to attract recruits by competing in the 
school’s premier facility.  As the Fresno State and FGCU cases demonstrate, a
coach who complains about either the length of her contract or the lack of 
support for her program puts her job at risk by appearing uncooperative, selfish,
and difficult.  On the other hand, her job is rendered vulnerable by the fact that 
discrimination in the allocation of resources and support is itself a barrier to her 
team’s success.207  This vulnerability is exacerbated by a short period of
contractual employment, which limits her opportunity to recover from isolated 
poor performance.  This double bind is perfectly illustrated in the lawsuit filed
by Deena Deardurff Schmidt, who was expected to produce a successful swim
team even in the absence of a pool.  San Diego State denied her the support she
needed to achieve the benchmarks of success upon which she was being
evaluated, and then fired her either because she advocated for more support
(her allegation) or because she did not succeed (SDSU’s defense).  Amy Draper’s
 204. Rhode & Walker, supra note 47, at 12-14 (providing statistics demonstrating that women are
underrepresented among coaches whose teams make it to the NCAA tournament and national
championships, and suggesting that female coaches’ lack of access to resources could be contributing
to this disparity); id. at 33 (reporting that 59.8% of female coaches of women’s teams who responded
to their survey thought that institutional support of female coaches was necessary for female coaches 
to succeed, in comparison to 31.5% of male coaches of women’s teams).
205. See supra Part III.A. 
206. Confronted with charges of retaliation, many of the university-defendants in these cases 
defended that they were motivated instead by the coaches’ poor win-loss records (Fresno State, 
Tennessee-Martin, and San Diego State, for example) suggesting that such reasons, when true, are 
routine and acceptable. 
207. See, e.g., Rhode & Walker, supra note 47, at 24 (reporting results of a survey of coaches of 
women’s sports, in which more than 90% identified institutional support and financial resources as 
“very important” or “most important” to a coach’s success); id. at 26 (reporting coaches’ open-ended
responses such as “low funding means low performance” and “financial resources are by FAR, the 
most important item in any college sport.  Without equal across the board funding, a program 
cannot be expected to be highly competitive or of championship caliber.”). 
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case against Tennessee-Martin also reflects this theme, as she alleges that she 
was fired for lobbying for her team’s fair share of resources, and the university
defends that she was in fact fired for “poor performance” after having a losing
season.208 
In sum, these cases suggest a tendency in athletic departments to 
essentially handicap female coaches by failing to provide their teams 
comparable resources and support, but holding them to the same or higher 
expectation to produce winning seasons.  Thus, a double bind is created when
coaches risk being fired in retaliation for complaining about the resources they
lack, when this dearth of resources or support undermines their teams’ 
performances and therefore negatively impacts their job evaluations. This 
double bind, which seems to affect female coaches, may be seen as a barrier to
women’s leadership in athletics and could even help explain women’s 
underrepresentation in this field. 
D. The Gender Conformity/Nonconformity Double Bind
A second thematic double bind also emerges from the retaliation cases
described in this Article: female coaches are exploited for gender conforming 
behavior and punished for gender nonconforming behavior.  Robin Potera-
Haskins, for example, alleged that she was hired with the expectation that she 
produce a winning team.209  Though she succeeded in doing exactly that, she 
may have ultimately been punished for having an intense and competitive 
personality and the athletic director’s discomfort with her “abrasive” style.210 
These characteristics are typical and acceptable among male coaches and
administrators, but in Potera-Haskins’s case, may have been seen as gender
nonconforming. Similarly, Karen Moe Humphreys reported that her male 
supervisors at Berkeley criticized her for being “intimidating” and “too strong
for a woman.”211  Had either of these women adopted a friendlier, more easy-
going style, however, they might have earned personality points with their
bosses, but would have jeopardized their continued employment in athletics, a 
field that places a premium on strength and competitive spirit.212 
208. Draper Complaint, supra note 155, at 11.  Draper’s allegation that the Athletic Director had 
assured her that “winning is not the most important thing” as she endeavored to turn around a
losing program belies the university’s claim that her termination was performance-related.  Id. at 4. 
Her allegation that the department retained male coaches who had never had a winning season
further underscores the existence of a double standard. Id. at 14.
209. See Potera-Haskins Complaint, supra note 148, at 4.
 210. Jacobson, supra note 152.
211. Humphreys Complaint, supra note 120, at 7. See supra note 125.
212. Melanie Sartore & George B. Cunningham, Explaining the Under-Representation of Women in
Leadership Positions of Sport Organizations: A Symbolic Interactionist Perspective, 59 QUEST 244, 248 
(2007) (stereotypes about women, such as that they are helpful, warm, kind, and gentle may 
“undermine perceptions of competence and power”); Rhode & Walker, supra note 47, at 35 (“What is
assertive in a man seems abrasive in a woman, and female leaders risk seeming too feminine or not
feminine enough.”); Julie A. Baird, Playing It Straight: An Analysis of Current Legal Protections to 
Combat Homophobia and Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Intercollegiate Athletics, 17 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 31, 35-36 (2002) (“The harmful Catch-22 is that the characteristics that lead to success in
the athletic arena (such as aggressiveness) are the same characteristics that can ultimately lead to
stereotyping and discrimination.”). 


























   
   




   
    
  
 SIDELINED 33 
The Fresno State plaintiffs also faced a version of this double bind. 
Milutinovich, Vivas, and Wright all demonstrated gender nonconforming 
behavior213 by challenging the male leadership of the athletic department 
through their advocacy for gender equity.  As a result of speaking out,
Milutinovich and Wright were marginalized as “the other team” and received
punishment in the form of inferior salaries and contract terms; ultimately, job 
termination befell Milutinovich and Vivas for their actions.214  In contrast, Stacy
Johnson-Klein was hired for her gender conforming and heterosexy appearance,
which she likely felt pressure to retain due to the homophobic sentiments 
directed at gender nonconforming coaches.  But this approach did not protect 
Johnson-Klein from the subordination she, too, experienced in the form of 
sexual harassment and exploitation.215  These examples show how social 
expectations and stereotypes hamstring women in athletics.  For the coaches 
mentioned here, the operation of the gender nonconformity/conformity double 
bind resulted in negative employment consequences.  By creating additional 
obstacles for female coaches to maneuver, creating job dissatisfaction, and
decreasing the amount of mental energy coaches have available to devote to 
other aspects of their jobs, the double bind may function as a barrier to women’s 
leadership in athletics.216 
E. Homophobia and Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation 
Several cases involving the intersection of sex discrimination and sexual
orientation discrimination demonstrate how gay-baiting and homophobia
continue to be deployed as weapons against female coaches.  The litigation
against Fresno State is rife with examples.  The jury in Lindy Vivas’s case 
validated her claim that she was discriminated against for her perceived sexual 
orientation after hearing testimony that the athletic director insisted female 
coaches play on the “home team” instead of the “other team,” a reference to the 
female coaches he apparently suspected were gay.217  According to witnesses, 
the athletic director had also said, “we need to get rid of the lesbians,”218 and 
that he had a “lesbian hit list” of coaches he wanted to terminate.219  He also  
tolerated a climate wherein it was acceptable for staff to “blar[e]” a talk radio 
program critical of Vivas and softball coach Margie Wright, a program in which 
the host made homophobic comments about them.220  This climate was such that
the staff felt comfortable declaring “Ugly women’s athletes day” while 
213. Brake, supra note 46, at 34 (describing research finding that women who challenge the most 
blatant examples of sex discrimination received the harshest reprisals, a result explained by the
possibility that, for a woman, the act of challenging such discrimination is a “more clear challenge to
the social order and transgressed traditional gender-role expectations”). 
214. Supra note 79 and accompanying text.
215. Supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
216. Cf. CHRISTINA CRUZ, GENDER GAMES: WHY WOMEN COACHES ARE LOSING THE FIELD 39–40,
77 (2009) (describing internal “tension” faced by female coach as she sought to balance both 
traditionally feminine and non-feminine roles on the job). 
217. See Part II.A supra. 
218. Chris Collins, Pattern of Hostility Alleged at Fresno State, FRESNO BEE, June 8, 2007, at A1.
 219. Bryant-Jon Anteola, Defense Contests Anti-Gay Portrait, FRESNO BEE, June 26, 2007, at D1.
 220. Bryant-Jon Anteola, Vivas Never Heard Direct Slurs, FRESNO BEE, June 14, 2007, at D1.
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symbolically reproducing the stereotype of the mannish (lesbian) athlete by
juxtaposing men’s faces on female athletes’ bodies.221 
Jaye Flood’s case against FGCU also presents elements of homophobic 
undertones. After it became known that she had participated in the drafting of
Merrily Dean Baker’s letter about gender discrimination in the athletic
department, Flood was charged with having a relationship with a woman on a 
road trip and inappropriately touching a student by tugging on her shirt.222  The
charge that ultimately resulted in her termination (which she denied and
claimed was part of the retaliation against her) was that she had an “amorous”
relationship with a female student.223  The lawsuits against San Diego Mesa 
College and Feather River College both contain allegations that the college
officials were concerned about the image of athletic programs led by lesbian
coaches, and the Mesa College plaintiffs allege that they were fired in part 
because the newspaper mentioned their lesbian relationship. 
In 1991, sport scholar Helen Lenskyj described the climate of college
athletics as “so anti-woman, anti-lesbian and anti-feminist that most lesbians, 
whether athletes, coaches, administrators or faculty, remain invisible for reasons 
of simple survival.”224  Later, in 1998, Pat Griffin’s Strong Women, Deep Closets
described the homophobic climate of athletic departments as either actively
hostile toward lesbians (or those perceived to be lesbians) or “conditionally
tolerant” of those who agree to cover their lesbianism and to adopt indicia of 
heterosexuality.225  The examples of homophobia presented in the contemporary 
retaliation cases discussed here suggest that, despite increasing public
acceptance of gays and lesbians, elements of that same climate described by
Lenskyj and Griffin still exist today.  The examples also provide support to the 
theoretical basis for the existence of homophobia in sport. 
One explanation for the persistence of homophobia in sport contexts 
including college athletics is that its primary purpose is not exclusion of gays
and lesbians per se.  Rather, similar to the discrimination and double binds 
discussed above, it is a weapon in the service of sex discrimination.  Society is
deeply invested in gender differentiation and hierarchy, and to that end, relies
on sport as the context for creating and valorizing a hegemonic masculinity.226 
Women’s sport in general is acceptable and accepted only to the extent it does 
221. See supra note 80. 
222. The shirt-tugging charge invokes homophobia because it likely derives from, and lends
support to, the stereotype of predatory lesbian coaches.  PAT GRIFFIN, STRONG WOMEN, DEEP 
CLOSETS: LESBIANS AND HOMOPHOBIA IN SPORT 57-59 (1998); see also Vikki Krane & Heather Barber,
Identity Tensions in Lesbian Intercollegiate Coaches, 76 RES. Q FOR EXERCISE AND SPORT 67, 73 (2005) 
(lesbian coaches report going out of their way to not touch players in the usual way that coaches do, 
due to a perceived likelihood that this could be misperceived as sexual). 
223. See Part II.B supra. 
224. Helen Lenskyj, Unsafe at Home Base: Women’s Experiences of Sexual Harassment in University
Sport and Physical Education, 1 WOMEN IN SPORT & PHYSICAL ACTIVITY J. 19, 19 (1992).
 225. GRIFFIN, supra note 222, at 93-107; see also  CRUZ, supra note 216, at 58 (describing a lesbian
coach whose acceptance by her athletic department was “based on the condition that she forego a 
masculine look”). 
226. GRIFFIN, supra note 222, at 17.
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not pose a challenge to the association of sport with masculinity.227  Women  
whose appearance evokes feminine stereotypes of weakness, passivity, and lack
of aggression or competitiveness do not threaten the hegemonic masculinity in 
sports, while also allowing women’s athletics to be constructed as distinct and 
“other.”  This explains athletic departments’ hiring preferences for coaches who 
convey normative femininity, including heterosexuality, and intolerance for 
coaches whose lesbianism is known or perceived. The Fresno State athletic
director’s comments on the hiring of Stacey Johnson-Klein, Feather River
College’s failure to hire Laurel Wartluft, and Mesa College’s termination of
coaches who were out in the newspaper, serve as examples of these tendencies 
and is consistent with other qualitative research along these same lines.228 
It has also been suggested that the sporting world’s intolerance for lesbians
allows the lesbian label to remain stigmatized and, thus, deployed as a powerful
derogatory to intimidate women and control their experience in sport.229  As  
Griffin explains, the threat of the lesbian stigma can be used, for example, “to 
discourage the bonding that occurs among women in athletics” in order to
“keep women from discovering their own power.”230  Thus, it is no surprise that
anti-lesbian sentiment was present in two athletic departments—those of Florida 
Gulf Coast University and Fresno State—where female coaches and 
administrators were cooperating with each other and acted with the support of a 
high-ranking woman.  At FGCU, the female coaches and athletic director emerita
Merrily Dean Baker worked together to present their concerns to the university 
administration.  Fresno State coaches Vivas and Wright, and eventually
Johnson-Klein, received support and advocacy from Milutinovich while she was
associate athletic director and even after she had been transferred out of the
227. Id. (“Women’s presence in sport as serious participants dilutes the importance and 
exclusivity of sport as a training ground for learning about and accepting traditional male gender
roles and the privileges that their adoption confers on (white, heterosexual) men.”). 
228. See Krane & Barber, supra note 222, at 72 (describing how participants witnessed hiring 
discrimination against open and perceived lesbian applicants for coaching positions, and one 
participant’s report that she received her first ever negative performance evaluation in the wake of 
coming out, along with a letter in her file that specifically said if her contract was not renewed, “it 
would not be because she was a lesbian”). 
229. GRIFFIN, supra note 222, at 20; see also Krane & Barber, supra note 222, at 71-73 (reporting
coaches’ fears that if they are openly lesbian, they won’t get promoted, or risk getting fired).  For
example, after former Howard University basketball coach Sanya Tyler complained about gender 
inequities in her athletic department, rumors circulated that she received negative evaluations, stole
money, and tried to get the university in trouble with the NCAA.  Yet it was the rumor that she was 
a lesbian, which also started at that time, that Tyler called “possibly . . . the most damaging thing
said about me.”  Debra E. Blum, College Sports’ L-Word, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 9, 1994, at
A35.
 230. GRIFFIN, supra note 222, at 20; see also Kerrie J. Kauer & Vikki Krane, “Scary Dykes” and
“Feminine Queens”: Stereotypes and Female Collegiate Athletes, 15 WOMEN IN SPORT & PHYSICAL
ACTIVITY J. 42, 44 (2006) (“As long as female athletes are divided, it is unlikely that women in sport 
will come together to challenge the status quo.  Therefore, the lesbian label is used as a weapon of
power to stigmatize female athletes and create dissention among them.”). 
While homophobia also exists in men’s sports, male coaches are not routinely subjected to antigay
bias in the contexts of recruiting, hiring, and daily athletic department culture. See Blum, supra note
229.
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athletic department.231  The labeling of the Fresno State coaches and 
Milutinovich as the “other team”232 was likely intended to discourage other
women from joining their efforts by threatening that the lesbian stigma would 
attach to them by association.  FGCU’s investigation of Flood on charges having
to do with lesbianism233 could also be seen as an effort to make an example of 
her in order to threaten, control, and divide the group of women who sought to 
collectively surmount their powerlessness in the department. 
F. Double Standards 
Another theme that emerges from the retaliation cases is gender-based
double standards for job performance.  Surina Dixon’s case against Texas 
Southern is particularly emblematic of this theme.  Dixon alleges that, despite 
being more qualified than a male coach hired at the same time, she was offered a 
lower salary and a shorter contract term than that male coach because she (but 
not he) had to “prove herself” to the athletic director.234  Similarly, Amy Draper 
complained that Tennessee-Martin held female coaches to a higher standard in 
two ways: first, by requiring only female coaches to have playing experience in
the sports they coached, and second, by requiring female coaches, but not male
coaches, to consistently have winning seasons.235  Karen Moe Humphreys’s case 
against U.C. Berkeley suggested that she and other women were passed over for 
promotions and subjected to layoffs despite seniority and experience, while men 
who lacked both were retained and promoted.236 
Scholars have documented similar double standards in the hiring and 
retention of coaches.  For example, studies have found that female coaches are
more likely than male coaches to have majored in physical education and to
have intercollegiate playing experience.237  The hiring of men due to their work 
experience, despite women’s educational background and playing experience, 
demonstrates a double standard.238  Along that vein, female coaches,
particularly younger ones, reported to focus group interviewers that they 
perceived having to work “twice as hard” as male counterparts in order to be 
taken seriously in their jobs.239 Such double standards contribute to a climate
231. While she was associate athletic director, and even after she was transferred out of athletics
and to the student union, Milutinovich advocated for gender equity on behalf of coaches as well as 
players, including by filing complaints with OCR.  See, e.g., Jeff Davis, Advocate on Leave at CSUF:
Fresno State Gender-Equity Proponent Says She’s Been Fired, FRESNO BEE, Aug. 3, 2006, at A1. After her
termination, Milutinovich continued to support Vivas and Johnson-Klein by testifying for both 
plaintiffs at their trials.  E.g., Michele Kort, Full Court Press, MS. MAGAZINE, Apr. 1, 2008, at 46.
232. See text at note 79, supra. 
233. See text at notes 97-101, supra. 
234. See text at notes 166, supra. 
235. See text at notes158-162, supra. 
236. See text at note 122, supra. 
237. Cathryn L. Claussen, Title IX and Employment Discrimination in Coaching Intercollegiate
Athletics, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 149, 158-59 (1994) (describing such studies).
238. Id. at 159.
 239. DRAGO ET AL., supra note 166, at 22; see also id. (“Younger women felt particularly 
disadvantaged as their age and gender worked against them.  By way of contrast, young men’s
gender provided them with an immediate legitimacy not experienced by young women in the
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where female coaches are devalued and demeaned, which in turn creates job 
dissatisfaction and turnover. 
G. Women Participating in Discrimination
The cases against Fresno State and FGCU both suggest that women are
more likely to be successful in their efforts to challenge sex discrimination in 
athletics when they cooperate with each other to this end.  The Fresno State 
plaintiffs, for example, worked together by testifying at each others’ trials,240 and
collaborated with the Senior Woman Administrator, Assistant Athletic Director
Diane Milutinovich, as they advocated for equal treatment for themselves and
their teams.  At FGCU, the female coaches and assistant coaches worked with
the athletic director emerita, Merrily Dean Baker, to present their concerns about 
gender equity to the department and university administration.241  But women 
in athletics are not always allies in disputes about sex discrimination.  Many of
the cases highlighted in this Article involve evidence or charges of women in
positions of power actively perpetuating the retaliation alleged.  For example, it
appears that it was a female athletic department administrator at FGCU who
laid the groundwork for Vaughn and Flood’s termination by putting falsified
negative performance evaluations in their files.242  Coach Draper of Tennessee-
Martin claims the Senior Woman Administrator was instrumental in the 
discriminatory treatment she and her team received.243  The female college
president at Feather River College was accused both of firing her male athletic
director and a female basketball coach who were trying to bring the athletic
department into compliance with Title IX and of making homophobic
statements about the coach.244  And a female athletic director was a named 
defendant in Terri Patraw’s suit against University of Nevada, Reno.245 
While it is impossible to speculate on the specific motivations of
individuals involved in the cases described, allegations of women perpetuating 
or supporting discrimination against other women provide an opportunity to
consider how male privilege operates to entrench discrimination against women 
in athletics.  Women, too, may capitalize on male privilege by offering support
to the existing gender hierarchy.  Moreover, they may have reason to believe 
that doing so is necessary for retention or consideration for promotion to
positions of power (or at least, token positions of power).246  Because Title IX 
field.”); see also Rhode & Walker, supra note 47, at 32 (some coaches responding to survey expressed 
that “women had to be ‘twice as hardworking’ and ‘twice as successful’ as male counterparts” in
order to earn respect).
240. See text at notes 80-83, supra. 
241. See text at note 95, supra. 
242. Brad Kane, Inquiry: FGCU Officials Tried to Fire Coach a Year Ago, Investigation Shows Assistant 
Athletic Director Changed Evaluation in Attempt to Oust Volleyball Coach, NAPLES DAILY NEWS, Feb. 8,
2008.
243. See text at note 143, supra. 
244. See text at note142-145, supra. 
245. See Patraw Complaint, supra note 138.
246. On tokenism, see Kane, supra note 19, at 128 (presenting findings to support the presence of
token women in leadership positions in sport and arguing that tokenism is “insidious” because “it 
gives the impression that the system is open and egalitarian”). 
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issues are often perceived as pitting the interests of women’s sports against
those of men’s sports,247 women in positions of power in athletics may be 
motivated to establish their loyalty to men with power over them (athletic 
directors, university presidents, powerful alumni and donors) or even to men 
subordinate to them whose support and favor they wish to cultivate, by 
rebuffing female coaches’ demands for parity in pay and equality for female
athletes.248 Feminist theorists describe such practices as complicity in one’s own
oppression.249 As the retaliation claims themselves make clear, such complicity 
cannot be considered without the context of the gender hierarchy that exists in 
sport: a hierarchy in which actions that sustain that hierarchy are rewarded
while efforts to dismantle it are punished.250  Thus, the fact that women
themselves participate in discrimination against other women suggests that
another barrier to women’s leadership, power, and equality is the effectiveness
of the dominant culture at fracturing women’s loyalties and rendering them less
effective as a group.
In sum, the themes exposed by recently-filed retaliation cases reveal and
underscore existing obstacles to women’s leadership in athletics.  In addition to
exposing the fact and manner of retaliation coaches often face for speaking out
against sex discrimination in athletics, such cases raise judicial and public
awareness of themes inherent in the predicate discrimination itself.  Such themes 
include discrimination against women’s sports programs, employment 
discrimination, discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity and sexual 
orientation, and pressure for female administrators and others to support and
participate in such practices.  However, it is possible such exposure enables a 
remedy. Thus, the remedial potential of the retaliation trend is examined in the 
next Part. 
PART IV 
LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RETALIATION CASES
To those who study sport and gender, the obstacles to women’s leadership 
in athletics described in Part III are neither surprising nor new.  What is 
significant, however, is that these issues are increasingly factoring into litigation
and that several of those cases have produced verdicts and settlements favorable 
to plaintiffs.  The retaliation complaints filed in the wake of Jackson v. 
Birmingham Board of Education are exposing judges and juries to double binds, 
double standards, homophobia, and other nuances of discrimination that sustain 
athletics leadership as a predominantly male enterprise.  For both legal and
247. E.g., Rhode & Walker, supra note 47, at 23–24 (coaches of women’s teams who responded to
survey both reflected and challenged this viewpoint). 
248. Cf. Stangl & Kane, supra note 171, at 57-59 (suggesting that female athletic directors do not
necessarily have the power equal to that of their male counterparts, due to men’s strong incentive to
maintain their hegemonic privilege and their entrenched control over employment determinations); 
Kane, supra note 19, at 127–28 (making a similar point).
249. E.g., SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX xxvii (H.M. Parshley trans. Vintage Books ed. 
1989).
 250. Brake, supra note 46, at 20 (explaining how retaliation operates to “suppress discrimination 
claims and preserve the social order” by silencing those who would challenge inequality). 
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practical reasons to be addressed in this Part, many of these situations would be 
difficult to remediate directly. For issues involving compensation
discrimination, sexual orientation discrimination, and programmatic
discrimination, for example, the retaliation cause of action is helping expose and
indirectly make schools accountable for conduct that might otherwise not be 
litigated because it is marginal, difficult to prove, or outweighed by the financial 
(and other) costs of bringing a legal challenge.  Thus, the right of action for 
retaliation operates to fill existing gaps in enforcement of Title IX and challenges
to sex discrimination in athletics more broadly. 
A. Retaliation Claims and Pay Discrimination 
The increased profile of retaliation cases may give plaintiffs greater
leverage to address disparities in compensation.251  While salary disparities
between coaches of women’s and men’s teams252 and between female and male 
coaches253 are widespread and well-known, they have proven difficult to
remediate in court. Female coaches have sought to challenge salary disparities 
as sex discrimination under the Equal Pay Act254 and Title VII255 with mixed 
results.256  Both statutes prohibit employers from paying employees differently 
251. See supra Part III.A. 
252. See, e.g., NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2004-06 NCAA REVENUES AND EXPENSES OF
DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS REPORT 46, 47 (Mar. 2008), available at http://
www.ncaapublications.com/ProductsDetailView.aspx?sku=RE2008 (finding many examples of 
disparities in mean salaries for head coaches of men’s and women’s teams of the same sport—for 
example, among Division I, Football Bowl Subdivision (D-IA) schools, the mean head coach salary
for lacrosse teams was $161,900 (men’s) and $80,200 (women’s); for gymnastics, $107,400 (men’s) and
$89,200 (women’s); and for hockey $222,000 (men’s) and $129,600 (women’s)—figures that do not
include endorsements and other payments coaches received from third parties, which skewed
disparities even further). 
253. See supra note 188.
254. The Equal Pay Act prohibits employers from paying employees at a rate less than
employees of the opposite sex at the same establishment “for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar 
working conditions . . . ”  29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006).
255. Title VII prohibits discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment, including
compensation.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).  Instances of unequal pay for equal work that violate
the Equal Pay Act will violate Title VII as well.  However, Title VII’s prohibition on wage
discrimination goes further than the Equal Pay Act, and applies to all wage discrimination, such as, 
for example, a decision to offer bonuses or other benefits to male but not female coaches (regardless 
of whether the jobs are substantially equal).  Disparate hiring patterns that also create compensation
disparities could also violate Title VII outside the context of an “equal pay for equal work” claim.
Title IX regulations also require gender equity in the “assignment and compensation of coaches.”  34
C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(6) (2009).  However, because these regulations address student athletes, the OCR 
does not consider the sex of the coaches in evaluating an institution’s compliance with these factors, 
only whether the coaching received by female athletes is comparable to that afforded to their male
counterparts.  See  VALERIE M. BONNETTE & LAMAR DANIEL, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX
INVESTIGATOR’S MANUAL 58 (1990).
256. Compare Hankinson v. Thomas County Sch. Sys., 257 Fed. Appx. 199, 202 (11th Cir. 2007)
(affirming summary judgment to defendant on Title VII claim, but reversing summary judgment for 
defendant on the Equal Pay Act claim); Perdue v. City Univ. of New York, 13 F. Supp. 326, 333-34
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (upholding jury’s award of damages to coach for Equal Pay Act violation); LeGoff v. 
Trustees. of Boston Univ., 23 F. Supp. 2d 120, 125 (D. Mass. 1998) (female coach established prima
facie case under Equal Pay Act, where she was given more responsibilities and paid less than male 
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40 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 17:1 2010
for similar work, but in the context of athletics, it can be difficult to compare 
head coach positions across sports or across teams.  It is lawful for universities 
to offer higher salaries to coaches with greater job responsibilities due to larger
rosters, bigger budgets, or greater travel obligations stemming from region of
competition and recruiting.257  Moreover, differences in experience levels and 
the market value of the coach’s services may also justify a decision to
compensate some coaches more than others.258  Though regulatory guidance 
suggests that differences between head coach positions that derive from sex
discrimination do not justify unequal pay,259 it may be difficult to identify, parse 
out, and prove such discrimination.260 Moreover, courts can avoid considering
the possibility that such discrimination exists by relying on other differences 
between the coaches or their positions to justify the disparity in pay.261 
The difficulty and uncertainty surrounding pay discrimination cases likely
deters plaintiffs from litigating them in many instances.  But because a 
retaliation case does not depend on whether the challenged practice constitutes 
actionable discrimination,262 a coach may be more likely to file suit when she can
bring a retaliation claim as well.  The potential cause of action for retaliation also
coaches), and Claussen, supra note 237, at 163-64 (describing two additional cases in which juries 
awarded remedies to female coaches who challenged pay disparities), with Stanley v. Univ. of S. 
Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1073-77 (9th Cir. 1999) (dismissing female coach’s Equal Pay Act claim); Weaver 
v. Ohio State Univ., 71 F. Supp. 2d 789, 799-801 (S.D. Ohio 1998); Bartges v. Univ. of N.C., 908 F. 
Supp. 1312, 1322-24 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (same); Harker v. Utica Coll. of Syracuse Univ., 885 F. Supp. 
378, 389-91 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (same), and Deli v. Univ. of Minn., 863 F. Supp. 958, 960-61 (D. Minn.
1994) (same).
257. See, e.g., Hankinson, 257 Fed. Appx. at 201 (jury could find that softball and baseball coach
positions were comparable, even though baseball coach had more players on his roster, coached
more games, and baseball games tend to take more time than softball games, because he had
assistants who were more qualified than Haskinson’s assistants who helped him manage additional
responsibilities); Perdue, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 334 (finding that women and men’s basketball coaches had
comparable jobs due to similar number of players, seasons, and administrative responsibilities); Deli, 
863 F. Supp. at 961 (rejecting a female gymnastics coach’s claim that her salary, less than the coaches
of three men’s teams—football, hockey, and basketball—was pay discrimination under the Equal 
Pay Act because those male coaches had more athletes on their rosters, more employees to
supervise, and garnered greater spectator attendance which resulted in more revenue). 
258. See, e.g., Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1073-74 (endorsing higher pay to male coach with 31 years
experience compared to female coach with 17); Weaver v. Ohio State Univ., 71 F. Supp. 2d 789,
801(S.D. Ohio 1998) (finding that difference in market value justified higher salary for men’s ice
hockey coach than women’s field hockey coach, since the existence of a professional men’s hockey
league increased the demand for qualified men’s hockey coaches). 
259. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON SEX 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE COMPENSATION OF SPORTS COACHES IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, EEOC
NOTICE NO. 915.002 (1997), available at http://eeoc.gov/policy/docs/coaches.html (suggesting, for
example, that a university cannot justify paying a male coach more based on his ability to generate
more revenue, if the university does not offer a female coach equivalent support for marketing and 
promotion).  At least one court has refused to defer to this guidance. Weaver, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 802.
 260. Rhode & Walker, supra note 47, at 18 (describing how difficult it is to prevail in pay 
discrimination cases). 
261. See, e.g., Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1075 (avoiding the question of whether the greater market 
demand for men’s basketball justified higher salary for men’s team head coach by finding that the
men’s team coach’s higher level of experience alone justified paying him substantially more than the
head coach of the women’s basketball team). 
262. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.



















   
   
    
  





   
  





   
 SIDELINED 41 
provides additional leverage that plaintiffs can use to negotiate for a favorable 
settlement.263 
In addition, the availability of a remedy for retaliation deters universities 
from engaging in unlawful reprisal and therefore makes it safer for a coach to
challenge her salary and employment conditions internally.  The potential for
plaintiffs to win large jury verdicts and settlements in retaliation claims
predicated on salary discrimination compels universities to contemplate the
public, external costs of disparate salaries.  On a societal level, litigation 
challenging retaliation raises both judicial and public awareness of the
underlying problem of unequal pay, which may help pressure universities to
distribute salaries more evenly.  Given the relationship between salary and job 
satisfaction,264 the potential for retaliation cases to influence higher 
compensation for women coaches may in turn contribute to a solution to the
gender gap in college coaching. 
B. Retaliation Claims and Homophobia and Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Retaliation claims hold similar promise to address and mitigate
homophobia and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in athletics.
While women in athletics, including coaches, have been disproportionately
subjected to scrutiny for gender nonconformity and stigmatized by suspicions of
lesbianism,265 litigation on this issue is exceedingly rare.266  A likely explanation 
is that homophobia manifests itself in subtle ways that are difficult to bolster 
with concrete evidence.  Without such proof, a plaintiff may assume the chances 
of victory are slim and decide not to bring suit. 
Another explanation for the absence of litigation in this realm is that the 
law affords very little reliable protection against discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.  Sexual orientation discrimination generally receives the 
lowest level of constitutional protection267 and is not categorically prohibited by 
263. Cf. Rhode & Walker, supra note 47, at 18 (“Although pay discrimination cases are difficult to
win, the prospect of litigation does give women coaches additional negotiation leverage.  And in
many cases, when claims survive summary judgment, the result is a settlement that redresses some 
of the compensation disparity.”). 
264. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
265. See supra Parts III.D and E. 
266. The only reported decision addressing discrimination against a lesbian coach, who was also
a high school teacher, was decided on constitutional grounds.  A federal district court held that the
school district that dismissed the coach from both positions because she was open about her sexual
orientation violated her rights to free speech and equal protection under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.  Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1286, 1288-90 (D. Utah 1998). 
Weaver’s lawsuit also included a retaliation claim, on which she also prevailed.  Id. at 1290-91.
267. The Equal Protection Clause, contained in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, prohibits state entities, including public universities, from discriminating against 
citizens on the basis of membership in a defined group or class.  In general, however, this doctrine
affords little protection to gay and lesbian plaintiffs.  In contrast to discrimination on the basis of
race and sex, which is only upheld if done for compelling or important purposes, state actors may
permissibly treat gay and lesbian citizens differently so long as they proffer some rational basis for
doing so.  Under this permissive standard, courts have upheld discrimination against gays and
lesbians in the contexts of government employment, military service, adoption, and marriage.  See, 
e.g., Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008) (military service); Lofton v. Sec’y of
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federal employment discrimination law268 or the antidiscrimination laws of
many states.269  Courts may construe sex discrimination laws like Title VII and 
Title IX to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity270—a 
potentially useful theory in the athletic context given the overlap between 
homophobia and sex stereotyping.271  But the fact that courts sometimes reject 
this theory or construe it narrowly272 likely affects plaintiffs’ confidence in the
potential to remediate sexual orientation discrimination through litigation.
Finally, the lesbian stigma itself likely causes coaches to be particularly risk 
averse in deciding to challenge homophobia in sport.  By bringing such a claim,
a coach associates herself publically with lesbianism, which, so long as this is a
stigmatized association in the field of athletics, compromises her future
employability.273  With so much to lose, a coach could easily be dissuaded from
filing suit by the legal and factual obstacles that a lawsuit would face.  But when
she can bolster her sexual orientation discrimination claim with a retaliation
claim imbued in the confidence that flows from multimillion dollar verdicts and 
settlements, she is more likely to do so. Moreover, the fact that a jury validated 
the Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) (adoption); High Tech Gays v.
Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) (federal employment); Hernandez v. 
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (prohibition on same-sex marriage survives rational basis scrutiny
under the New York Constitution’s equal protection clause).  See also David S. Cohen, Title IX: 
Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 217, 256-57 (2005) (“Courts that have addressed
equal protection claims based on sexual orientation discrimination in education have analyzed the 
school’s actions under the most basic equal protection standard, the rational basis test.  School action
motivated by animus fails this rational basis test.  While no court has found a rational basis for 
indifference toward harassment based on sexual orientation, it is conceivable that courts would 
permit, under the Constitution, other forms of educational discrimination based on sexual
orientation, as they have unfortunately permitted, under the Constitution, discrimination against
gays and lesbians in other areas of the law.”). 
268. The Employment Nondiscrimination Act, H.R. 3017, currently pending in Congress, would 
add sexual orientation and gender expression to the characteristics protected under federal 
employment discrimination law. 
269. According to Lambda Legal, 20 states plus the District of Columbia prohibit private
employers from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, while 28 ban such discrimination
in the public sector, available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/states-regions/. 
270. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“[A]n employer
who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has
acted on the basis of gender.”); see also Anthony E. Varona & Jeffrey M. Monks, EN/Gendering
Equality: Seeking Relief Under Title VII Against Employment Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 7
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 67, 131 (2000) (“Gender nonconformity standing alone, as in the Price
Waterhouse case, can invoke Title VII relief, but typically not when it is combined with perceived or
actual homosexuality.”).
 271. Baird, supra note 212, at 60-61; supra Part III.E. 
272. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(“Jespersen’s claim here materially differs from Hopkins’ claim in Price Waterhouse because Harrah’s 
grooming standards do not require Jespersen to conform to a stereotypical image that would 
objectively impede her ability to perform her job requirements as a bartender.”). 
The sex stereotyping rationale is also limited in the context of sexual orientation discrimination to
cases involving gender nonconformity in appearance or behavior.  Same-sex orientation itself is not
actionable gender nonconformity.  Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762-64 (6th Cir. 2006); 
see also Barbara Osborne, “No Drinking, No Drugs, No Lesbians”: Sexual Orientation Discrimination in
Intercollegiate Athletics, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 481, 495-96 (2007).
273. See Baird, supra note 212, at 41.
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Coach Sulpizio’s retaliation claim but not her sexual orientation discrimination
claim illustrates the relative difficulty in prevailing on sexual orientation 
discrimination claims and the value to plaintiffs in coupling them with 
retaliation claims.  As in the context of pay discrimination discussed above,
retaliation claims operate to deter discrimination in this context as well.  This 
deterrence occurs by increasing the potential for litigation, which in turn raises
the costs to universities of allowing athletic departments to maintain
homophobic climates. 
C. Retaliation Claims and Equal Treatment Claims
Retaliation claims also raise the potential for litigation about discrimination
in the resources and support allocated to men’s and women’s athletics.  While 
women’s collegiate teams receive only about a third of the operating and 
recruiting funds allocated to men’s teams,274 the inequities resulting from such 
disparate funding, in such areas as facilities, equipment, publicity and 
promotion, and recruiting budgets,275 have yet to receive much attention from 
private litigants.  Most cases raising Title IX’s application to college athletic
departments have challenged an inequitable distribution of athletic
opportunities to men and women (so-called “equal access” claims), either due to
a university’s decision to cut or demote an existing team276 or its failure to add
new teams for which there is abundant interest.277  While OCR’s attention is
increasingly drawn to issues related to the relative quality of those opportunities 
(so-called “equal treatment” claims),278 it is usually the monetary damages—or 
threat thereof—that come from private enforcement279 that are credited with
 274. WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUNDATION, 2008 STATISTICS - GENDER EQUITY IN HIGH SCHOOL AND
COLLEGE ATHLETICS: MOST RECENT PARTICIPATION & BUDGET STATISTICS, available at http:// 
womenssportsfoundation.org (noting that female college athletes receive “36% of sports operating 
dollars, which is $1.55 billion less than male college athletes,” and “33% of athletic team recruitment 
spending, which is $50 million less recruiting female athletes than male athletes.”).
275. See Part III.A, supra. 
276. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (university’s decision to demote women’s
gymnastics and volleyball to donor-funded varsity status violated Title IX); Roberts v. Colorado
State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993) (cutting varsity fast pitch women’s softball violated
Title IX); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Penn., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993) (affirming injunction to reinstate
women’s varsity field hockey and gymnastics programs); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 616 F. Supp. 
2d 277 (D. Conn. 2009) (injunction to preclude the elimination of women’s volleyball); Choike v. 
Slippery Rock Univ. of Penn., 2006 WL 2060576 (W.D.Pa. July 21, 2006) (ordering reinstatement of 
women’s varsity swimming and water polo). 
277. Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000) (university’s failure to fund
women’s fast-pitch softball and soccer violated Title IX). 
278. Recently, for example, a complaint filed with OCR against the University of Alaska at
Anchorage addressed disparities in the amount of locker room space allocated to men’s and 
women’s teams. See Beth Bragg, UAA Hit with Title IX Complaint, THE ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct.
29, 2008, available at http://www.adn.com/sports/story/571011.html. In another example, an
alumna’s complaint against the University of Charleston addressed the delays in the construction of
a softball field, which was part of a gender inequity settlement between OCR and UC.  See Veronica
Nett, Ex-UC Student Files Title IX Complaint, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Mar. 15, 2008, at P8A.
279. Title IX’s private right of action extends to both injunctive relief and damages. See Franklin 
v. Gwinnet County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992).  The sanction at stake in a public enforcement 
action by the Office for Civil Rights is termination of the educational institution’s federal funds. 
Buzuvis_cpcxns.doc 5/5/2010  1:43:11 PM  
     
 
















      
   
   





    
   
  
   
  
 




    
       
     
      
 
  
      
      
44 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 17:1 2010
motivating universities to comply with Title IX and its implementing 
regulations.280 Equal treatment claims, however, have not been on the forefront
of litigation seeking enforcement of Title IX, which has so far prioritized the lack
of opportunity over inequities related to facilities, equipment, uniforms, 
promotion and publicity, and the like.281 Moreover, the cases in which student 
plaintiffs have raised equal treatment claims demonstrate such cases are
vulnerable to early dismissal due to lack of standing,282 mootness,283 or failure to 
comply with the statute of limitations.284 
Retaliation cases predicated on complaints about unequal treatment have 
the potential to bolster enforcement of this aspect of Title IX as well.  The
availability of a remedy for retaliation predicated on such discrimination
ensures that coaches can safely raise internal and external challenges to such
disparities.285  Thus, after Jackson and in the wake of multi-million dollar jury 
verdicts and settlements awarded to coaches who experienced retaliation, a 
coach may feel more confident to speak freely about inequities to her Athletic 
Director, Title IX coordinator, or other appropriate university officials.286  Such 
protection may also bolster coaches’ participation in the self-study about gender
equity (among other issues) that the NCAA requires of its member
institutions,287 and it may give coaches more confidence to file a complaint with
However, owing to its “draconian” nature and the fact that it would deprive students of the very
benefits of education OCR seeks to secure, this sanction has never been imposed.  Julie A. Davies &
Lisa M. Bohon, Re-Imagining Public Enforcement of Title IX, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 25, 69-70 (2007).
Instead, OCR uses the threat of that sanction to secure prospective, corrective measures.  Id. at 41.
280. Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road to Title IX 
Compliance, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 51, 60-61 (1996) (“The threat of having to pay out large
damage awards also promised to operate as a powerful incentive for schools to bring their athletic
programs, as well as their other educational programs, into compliance with Title IX.”). 
281. But see Haffer v. Temple Univ. of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 678 F. Supp 517,
524-534 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (successfully challenging disparities in the distribution of athletic 
opportunities and in the funding of men’s and women’s athletics under the equal protection clause). 
282. Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 164 F.3d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (named plaintiffs, none of whom
were varsity level, lacked standing to challenge unequal treatment in varsity programs). 
283. Grandson v. Univ. of Minn., 272 F.3d 568, 574 (8th Cir. 2002) (dismissing challenge to
unequal treatment in the distribution of scholarships and funding, to the extent it sought prospective
relief, as moot upon players’ NCAA ineligibility or because they lacked varsity status, and also 
dismissing claim for monetary damages for plaintiffs’ failure to put university officials on notice).
284. Mansourian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ca. at Davis, 2007 WL 3046034, *5-*9 (E.D. Cal. 
Oct. 18. 2007) (unequal treatment claim dismissed as untimely).
285. See Brake, supra note 46, at 78 (discussing the importance of protecting individuals who raise
formal and informal objections to discrimination).
286. For example, Karen Moe Humphreys alleged that she experienced retaliation after 
complaining about gender discrimination to university officials investigating another coach’s claims 
of race discrimination. See supra note 123.
287. For Division I institutions, the results of the self-study must be reported to the NCAA,
whose approval is required for certification. See generally NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2008-
09 DIVISION I ATHLETICS CERTIFICATION HANDBOOK (2008), available at http://www.ncaa.org/
wps/ncaa?key=/ncaa/NCAA/Legislation%20and%20Governance/Compliance/Certification%20a 
nd%20Training/Athletics%20Certification/index-d1_ath_cert_prog.  Division II and III schools must
also conduct a self-study and generate a report that must be available to the NCAA upon request. 
See generally  NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, DIVISION II INSTITUTIONAL SELF-STUDY GUIDE
(2008-2009) and DIVISION III INSTITUTIONAL SELF-STUDY GUIDE (2008-2009), available at
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the Office for Civil Rights.288  And while internal and external complaints may
originate with others, such as students and parents,289 it is particularly 
important that coaches avail themselves of those procedures without fear of 
reprisal.  Coaches are uniquely situated to perceive whether the resources their
teams receive are adequate and fair and to present evidence of disparities. 
Coaches also have greater incentive than students or parents to address 
inequities that require a longer time horizon to redress, such as those related to 
facilities.  Thus, ensuring that coaches can speak freely about programmatic
disparities increases the likelihood that those disparities will be redressed. 
CONCLUSION
The retaliation cases that have been litigated and filed in the wake of
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education are valuable for what they reveal about 
obstacles to women’s leadership in athletics.  Their early success provides
grounds for cautious optimism in the potential for these cases to destabilize
those institutionalized impediments.  With the momentum of multimillion
dollar verdicts and settlements on their side, coaches are better situated now 
than ever before to seek remedies that will help ensure that the values college 
athletic departments are exercising and modeling include equal opportunity for 
the leadership of women. 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?key=/ncaa/NCAA/Legislation%20and%20Governance/Complia 
nce/Certification%20and%20Training/Self-study/issg.
288. OCR offers reassurance that its regulations prohibit retaliation against complainants and
those who participate in any investigation or proceeding related to the complaint. OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, HOW TO FILE A DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT WITH THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 3, available at
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/howto.pdf; see also 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (2000).  It
also conceals the identity of complainants.  See, e.g., Letter from OCR to Erin E. Buzuvis (on file with
author) (redacting the names of complainants in documents transmitted in response to FOIA request
for documents regarding OCR’s investigation of Fresno State, despite the fact that the identity of
such individuals would likely be obvious to anyone with knowledge of the case).  These measures 
did not, for example, deter Fresno State from retaliating against coaches who filed complaints with 
OCR. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect the availability of private enforcement and monetary 
damages to provide greater reassurance to coaches that their participation in OCR grievances is
protected. 
289. One does not have to be the victim of discrimination to file a complaint with OCR; anyone
may do so.  OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 288, at 2.
